US Army War College

USAWC Press
Monographs, Books, and Publications
5-1-2014

Russia After Putin
Richard J. Krickus Dr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs

Recommended Citation
Krickus, Richard J. Dr., "Russia After Putin" (2014). Monographs, Books, and Publications. 501.
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/501

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Monographs, Books, and Publications by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

UNITED STATES
ARMY WAR COLLEGE

PRESS

Carlisle Barracks, PA

Visit our website for other free publication
downloads
http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/
To rate this publication click here.

RUSSIA AFTER PUTIN
Richard J. Krickus

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

and

The United States Army War College
The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service
at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application
of Landpower.
The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates
who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently,
it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a “think factory” for commanders
and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage
in discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving
national security objectives.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national
security and strategic research and analysis to influence
policy debate and bridge the gap between military
and academia.

CENTER for
STRATEGIC
LEADERSHIP and
DEVELOPMENT

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

The Center for Strategic Leadership and Development
contributes to the education of world class senior
leaders, develops expert knowledge, and provides
solutions to strategic Army issues affecting the national
security community.
The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
provides subject matter expertise, technical review,
and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability
operations concepts and doctrines.

U.S. Army War College

SLDR

Senior Leader Development and Resiliency

The Senior Leader Development and Resiliency program
supports the United States Army War College’s lines of
effort to educate strategic leaders and provide well-being
education and support by developing self-awareness
through leader feedback and leader resiliency.
The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic
leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom
grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and
by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in
the analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional
expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security,
resource management, and responsible command.
The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center acquires,
conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use
to support the U.S. Army, educate an international
audience, and honor soldiers—past and present.

STRATEGIC
STUDIES
INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War
College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related
to national security and military strategy with emphasis on
geostrategic analysis.
The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct strategic
studies that develop policy recommendations on:
• Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined
employment of military forces;
• Regional strategic appraisals;
• The nature of land warfare;
• Matters affecting the Army’s future;
• The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and,
• Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.
Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern
topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of
Defense, and the larger national security community.
In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics
of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings
of conferences and topically oriented roundtables, expanded trip
reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.
The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the
Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army
participation in national security policy formulation.
i

Strategic Studies Institute
and
U.S. Army War College Press

RUSSIA AFTER PUTIN
Richard J. Krickus

May 2014

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.
Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and
U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full
academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified
information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent
official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to
offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for
public release; distribution is unlimited.
*****
This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code,
Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be
copyrighted.

iii

*****
Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should
be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S.
Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn
Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010.
*****
This manuscript was funded by the U.S. Army War
College External Research Associates Program. Information on
this program is available on our website, www.StrategicStudies
Institute.army.mil, at the Opportunities tab.
*****
All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War
College (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded free
of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of this report may
also be obtained free of charge while supplies last by placing
an order on the SSI website. SSI publications may be quoted
or reprinted in part or in full with permission and appropriate
credit given to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute and U.S.
Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA.
Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address:
www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.
*****
The Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War
College Press publishes a monthly email newsletter to update
the national security community on the research of our analysts,
recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides
a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you
are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the
SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter.

ISBN 1-58487-616-6

iv

FOREWORD
As the United States reassesses relations with Russia and develops doctrine that addresses a turbulent
security environment, Dr. Richard J. Krickus addresses a brace of pivotal questions that have a bearing on
the future of Vladimir Putin and his Power Vertical.
Are Putin’s days numbered as many Russian watchers
predict and what will Russia look like after he leaves
the Kremlin? Toward this end, Krickus assesses four
plausible scenarios. They include first, Status Quo,
depicting the major geo-political features of Russia
today; second, Stalin Lite that embraces most of the
characteristics of a police state; third, The Western
Path to Development that reflects pluralistic phenomenon associated with a “normal” European country;
and fourth, Russia in Chaos, an outcome that anticipates the virtual disintegration of Russia as we know
it today.
The plausibility of these scenarios varies with a
move toward Stalin Lite most likely—some would
argue that we are already there—a pluralistic Russia
less so, and a Russia consumed in chaos least likely. In
his assessment of all four outcomes, Dr. Krickus considers their domestic and international implications
and dwells specifically upon what bearing they might
have upon the capacity of the United States and Russia to collaborate in meeting common security problems: coping with international terrorism; stemming
the proliferation of weapons of mass destructrion;
and resolving violent internal struggles that have profound regional and international implications like the
Syrian Civil War.
Dr. Krickus concludes that, in spite of many obstacles, the leadership in Washington and Moscow
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must find ways to address security threats of this nature even as the United States rebalances toward Asia.
Moreover, he agrees with prominent statesmen like
Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger that ultimately, Russia must be integrated into a Euro-Atlantic
security system.
The unexpected turbulent events of September
2013 that have resulted in a United Nations resolution
compelling Syria to surrender its chemical weapons
and to restart the Geneva negotiations to find a diplomatic resolution to the Syrian crisis offers evidence
that a partnership, even if limited and fragile, is plausible. A major consideration of the U.S. national security establishment must be how to operationalize the
partnership.
For all intents and purposes, the United States and
Russia now have taken responsibility for resolving the
Syrian crisis and in the process have reached a new
chapter in the reset of relations. If they succeed in
finding a diplomatic solution to it, further cooperation
on other shared security concerns will follow. If not,
they will take a turn for the worse.
		

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Note: This research was completed in the fall of 2013, which
was obviously prior to the recent crisis in Crimea and Ukraine.

In 1999, after Boris Yeltsin appointed Vladimir Putin Prime Minister, the former Russian Secret Service
(KGB) agent pledged to create a powerful state at home
capable of projecting Russia’s influence abroad. He
spoke favorably about democracy but soon indicated
by his actions that political authority would be concentrated in his hands alone, although he surrounded
himself with a medley of supporters: members of the
security services and military—collectively known
as the Siloviki—business tycoons, high-level government officials, and members of criminal organizations. The state’s resurrection—what became known
as the Power Vertical—was made possible largely
through surging gas and oil revenues and Putin’s
tight hold over the reins of power. The revenues that
they produced, in turn, expanded the urban middle
class, and provided jobs for those working in Sovietera enterprises and entitlements for retirees. In return,
Putin enjoyed unprecedented approval in the eyes of
most Russians, therefore, after serving two terms as
president, he felt comfortable passing the job off to his
young assistant—Dmitry Medvedev.
But in the winter of 2011-12, massive public demonstrations in Moscow and St. Petersburg revealed that
the nation’s urban middle class—the university education privileged cosmopolitans—was disenchanted
with his rule. They were joined by a small number
of communists, nationalists, and other opponents of
his Power Vertical. Staunch supporters who lived in
the hinterland and occupied the lower rungs of the
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socio-economic ladder, the provincials, were also getting restive. Even some members of Putin’s own team
deserted him; for example, his former economic Czar,
Alexei Kudrin, resigned rather than support the dramatic increase in the defense budget and was joined
by some oligarchs and celebrities.
This medley of opponents accused Putin of rigging the 2011 Duma elections and his own re-election
in 2012. To make matters worse, it was forecasted
that Russia’s hydrocarbon production would decline,
while outmoded enterprises would prove incapable
of surviving global competition. Henceforth, revenues would neither sustain social services nor an
expanding defense budget, so both Putin’s domestic
and foreign policy agenda was in peril. It was only a
matter of time before his reign expired along with the
Power Vertical.
But soon after Putin began his third term, analysts
claimed that predictions of his imminent demise were
premature. In spite of a slippage in the polls, he remained the most popular politician in Russia, while
his opponents were divided, demoralized, and leaderless. Measures he took to silence them—including
restrictions on public demonstrations and the arrest
of opposition leaders—convinced many middle class
protestors that they had been too hasty in openly demanding his ouster. In an attempt to secure the provincials support, Putin exploited anti-Americanism
sentiment that resonated among millions of Russians
and portrayed his democratic detractors as agents of
foreign governments.
On the international front, Putin has reasserted
Russia’s influence throughout the space of the former Soviet Union. He has done so with mixed results;
for example, he has exploited Russia’s energy assets
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to hamper Armenia and Ukraine in their Westward
drive, but his alternative Economic Union has stalled.
As the United States reassesses relations with Russia and develops a strategic doctrine that addresses a
turbulent international security environment, a brace
of pivotal question remains to be answered: What is
in store for Putin's future and for the fate of the Power Vertical? What do the answers to these questions
mean for U.S.-Russian relations?
The purpose of this monograph is to address all
of these questions and provide conclusions and recommendations to help U.S. policymakers provide
appropriate answers to them. To accomplish this ambitious undertaking, two sets of scenarios will be considered. The first set is benign and include “The Status
Quo” and “The Western Path to Development.” The
second set is malignant and includes what has been
called, “Stalin Lite” and what amounts to a worst case
scenario, “Russia in Chaos.”
In looking at the first set of benign scenarios, the
following observations are pertinent:
Status Quo: A broad range of economic and political circumstances support the notion that in spite of a
multitude of challenges, the Power Vertical will persist even beyond Vladimir Putin’s tenure. It is against
this backdrop that a rebalance in U.S.-Russian relations will be evaluated.
The Western Path to Development: A faltering
economy, pressure from progressives in the Kremlin, a revitalized “democracy movement,” and disgruntled business oligarchs and grassroots upheaval
in the provinces will ultimately produce a more open
political system and law-based society. Under these
circumstances, Russia’s integration into the EuroAtlantic community is plausible.
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In addressing the second set of malignant scenarios, the following observations are pertinent:
Stalin Lite: In keeping with the crackdown that began soon after Putin was elected in 2012, a host of opposition figures were arrested, a number of oligarchs
fled the country, new restraints were imposed upon
the media and nongovernmental organizations, and
members of the inner circle whose loyalty was suspect
were removed from office. Under these circumstances,
the prospects for a rebalance in U.S.-Russian relations
are slim.
Russia in Chaos: Here, there is a collapse in the
Power Vertical along with a dramatic economic decline, and Russia appears to be following the path of
the former Soviet Union. This outcome may be less
plausible than any of the above, but should it materialize, it will have significant and dangerous implications for international stability in general and U.S.
international interests in particular. In sum, what happens next in Russia will have profound consequences
for the security of the United States and its allies. Russia remains the largest country in the world; most of
the earth’s population and resources are found near
it; and it is the only power that has the capacity to destroy the United States in a nuclear strike.
Russia must remain a U.S. major concern as American policymakers address two pivotal security challenges: a rebooting of the Euro-Atlantic security system that may ultimately include Russia, and an Asian
Pivot that acknowledges that Russia is a major player
in the Far East. While some analysts claim that clashing values necessitate a pause in relations, U.S.-Russian leaders must work toward a peaceful resolution
of the crises in Syria, Iran, and North Korea.
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The unexpected turbulent events of September
2013 that have resulted in a United Nations resolution
compelling Syria to surrender its chemical weapons
and restart in Geneva, Switzerland, to find a diplomatic resolution to the Syrian crisis offers evidence
that a partnership, even if limited and fragile, is plausible. A major consideration of the U.S. national security establishment must be how to operationalize such
a partnership.
For all intents and purposes, the United States and
Russia now have taken responsibility for resolving the
Syrian civil war and in the process have reached a new
chapter in the reset of their relations. If they succeed in
finding a diplomatic solution to the Syrian situation,
further cooperation on other security matters will follow. If not, they will take a turn for the worse.
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RUSSIA AFTER PUTIN
Note: This research was completed in the fall of 2013, which
was obviously prior to the recent crisis in Crimea and Ukraine.

INTRODUCTION
In the winter of 2011-12, Russians expressed their
outrage with Vladimir Putin in massive, unprecedented street protests. At one point, about 100,000
Muscovites braved the brutal cold and demanded his
ouster and the demise of his system of rule known as
the Power Vertical: a regime marked by personal rule
and relationships.
A small number of trusted figures around Mr. Putin,
perhaps twenty to thirty people, make the key decisions. At the very top is an even tighter inner circle of
about half a dozen individuals, all with close ties to
Putin, who have worked together for twenty years, beginning in St. Petersburg and continuing in Moscow.
Real decision making power resides inside the inner
circle; while Russia’s formal political institutions have
to varying degrees been emasculated.1

One of the most prominent organizers, Alexey Navalny, a blogger of renown, stunned government officials when he proclaimed that the throng was large:
enough . . . to seize the Kremlin and the White House
now, but we won’t as we are peaceful people, but
sooner or later we will take back what is rightfully
ours.2

Similar displays of public anger, albeit in smaller
numbers, erupted in St. Petersburg and other cities
and via TV and the Internet, mesmerized a global
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audience of billions. Even hard-edged pundits pondered whether they were witnessing a Russian version of the Arab Spring and the forced exit of autocratic rulers. Cowed by Czars and Soviet dictators for
centuries, Russians were now about to cast out their
tormentors.
This historic outburst had its roots in the September 2011 announcement that Putin would run for a
third term as president and not Dmitry Medvedev,
who was an open advocate of government transparency and pluralism. Putin’s proclamation abruptly
demonstrated that Medvedev was a mere puppet responding to the tugs of his master. More bad news
arrived that December when it was revealed that the
parliamentary elections had been rigged. This was in
keeping with Putin’s penchant for “overkill” since his
United Russia would have swept the field even if the
elections were fair, but when his personal power was
at risk, he did not take chances.
The demonstrations uplifted the spirits of the
Russians who yearned to live in a truly democratic society, and many of the protesters concluded that they
did not need Medvedev to accomplish that cherished
objective. They could achieve it through bottom-up reform. Putin’s newly assertive opposition consisted of
a medley of individuals and interests. Those most visible included middle class urbanites, cosmopolitans
who had college degrees, ate sushi, and took foreign
vacations—the very people Putin needed to restore
the state, to diversify the economy and to transform
Russia into a modern society. Clearly, this generation
was not spooked by the same show of force that had
intimidated their parents. They were not afraid! They
were joined in smaller numbers by a motley crew of
communists and nationalists that included some of
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the most prominent new and assertive leaders like Navalny, who gained national notoriety via his blog and
campaigns to fight corruption, and Sergei Udaltsov,
a leftist provocateur who proclaimed that he and his
supporters favored the immediate ouster of Putin and
his ilk. The bold behavior of these two men indicated
that something truly significant was abroad in Russia.3
Sharing platforms with these two firebrands were
liberals with familiar names like Boris Nemstov and
Gregory Yavlinsky, both of whom had served in past
governments. But in addition to these “old-timers”
and disgruntled middle class protesters, members of
Putin’s team like Alexei Kudrin—a former finance
minister—joined them in a turbulent protest on Moscow’s Sakharov Square. He had parted with Putin
over a decision to sustain a bloated defense budget
at the expense of other public programs. He was accompanied by former Putin staffers and one time
admirers, for example, Kseniya Sobchak, a huge TV
celebrity and daughter of Putin’s old boss, Anatoly
Sobchak, a one-time St. Petersburg Mayor. Obviously
ignoring the fate of the imprisoned Mikhail Khodorkovsky, some of the country’s richest men, for example, Mikhail Prochorov, joined the protestors. Some
pundits believed that like leaders of the “opposition”
parties in the Duma, he was a Kremlin stooge, a stageprop Putin could cite to burnish his democratic credentials. That said, the cosmopolitan activists were
receiving economic aid from some oligarchs—people
who had learned how to cover their backside or who
believed that change was inevitable.
Although demonstrations in Moscow and St. Petersburg captured the attention of the international
media, Putin remained the county’s most popular
politician. His stock, however, was in decline even
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among loyal followers in the vast Russian hinterland.
Unlike the cosmopolitans, these people, the provincials, did not enjoy much formal education, fancy foreign culinary treats, nor vacations abroad. At the same
time, they abhorred Western values and resented being lectured by Russia’s critics. On the contrary, they
were outspoken anti-Americans who remained tethered to old Soviet enterprises or were retirees living in
the desolate hinterland surviving on government entitlements. For them, Putin was the iconic strongman
that their ancestors celebrated throughout history—a
tough protector of Mother Russia. At the same time,
he could take credit for a vast improvement in conditions for tens of millions of Russians. Consequently,
they had given him their unqualified support during
his first two terms as president. By 2012, many now
associated his rule with economic inequality, corruption, lawlessness, and little or no improvement in
public services. But, as of yet, they were not prepared
to openly support Putin’s opponents.
While the road ahead was shrouded in mist,
Kremlin-watchers predicted a sea change in Russian
politics. Many doubted that Putin would survive his
third term, and their analysis rested largely upon the
expectation that he would be upended by the same
economic pitfalls that toppled his Soviet predecessors: most specifically, a decline in gas and oil output,
deflated prices for those commodities, and the failure
of the Kremlin to provide the country with a Plan
B. That is the failure to diversify a one-legged petro
economy and to create economic activity in a variety
of areas that allowed Russia to compete in the brutal
global market. As gas and oil revenues plunged, Putin
could no longer meet the promises that he made to his
base—the provincials—and provide them with jobs,
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pensions, and social welfare services, while meeting
the demands of the military-industrial complex. He
promised the generals and present-day replicas of
the Red Managers a spike in the defense budget even
though they wanted to maintain large and expensive
general purpose forces—presumably to match American military power—that clear-headed defense analysts deemed irrational and dangerous.
Calls for his removal were sustained by pandemic
corruption and other forms of lawless behavior and
growing resentment that a handful of oligarchs and
members of pro-Putin clans were living in luxury
while the average Russian was struggling to make
ends meet. In addition to surging popular disgruntlement, there were signs of discontent among Putin’s associates who relied upon his protection but were worried about their economic welfare. Like their Soviet
counterparts a generation ago, they could not ignore
the alarming observation that privileged members
of society—including “their kids”—were among the
demonstrators. Many younger members of the ruling
elite believed there was trouble ahead if the problems
that had ignited unprecedented protest were ignored.
Some concluded that it was prudent to join the future
rulers that were emerging from the gathering storm
and not oppose them.
But there was a two-fold problem with this prognosis. First, the demonstrators soon left the streets,
many even before Putin launched a crackdown on
public protests, and accused their leaders of criminal
behavior. They were not only divided by culture and
ideology, they had no single leader to rally them, nor
did they have a viable political program or any firm
idea about how they were going to press forward in
an organized fashion. Then Putin passed a medley of
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laws that portrayed any recipient of assistance from
abroad a “foreign agent,” expelled the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) for peddling subversion in Russia, redefined the meaning of traitorous behavior, and
took other measures to silence the pesky protestors.
By the end of the year, foreign journalists reported
that many of the younger members of the middle class
got the message and, like their parents, “They, too,
are afraid.”
A second problem was that those who predicted
the Power Vertical’s demise found themselves tonguetied when asked a pertinent question: “What would
replace it?” In the words of several highly respected
Russian analysts, “That Russia is in crisis is becoming
apparent. What are less apparent are the exact nature
and the stakes and options involved.”4
This monograph is an attempt to answer the question: “After Putin and the Power Vertical, what next?”
Given the prevailing inattention to the “Russian
Question” among the American foreign policy community, Russia’s fate has been treated as a sideshow
in Washington. There has been some discussion in the
White House about the prospects for a “re-balance”
in American-Russian relations that would address issues that concern both countries, but the Congress, the
media, and the public has shown little interest in the
enterprise. For most Americans, what happens in Russia is of little consequence and for members of Congress and the national security community, the most
compelling challenges are unfolding in Asia. In addition to the reckless comments and threatening behavior of the nuclear-armed leadership in North Korea,
China has been throwing its weight around in much
of Asia, prompting many analysts to see trouble ahead
with Beijing.
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To minimize the Russian Question is unwarranted
and could be dangerous. Only Russia can destroy the
United States in a nuclear strike, holds a valued veto at
the United Nations (UN) and covers a vast area of the
world where much of the earth’s population and resources can be found. Furthermore, a truculent uncooperative Russia may obstruct U.S. foreign policy priorities. What happens next in Russia, then, is of great
consequence for the global security environment and
therefore of paramount concern to the United States.
Toward this end, two sets of scenarios resting on a
medley of analysis, facts, trends and projections will
be assessed as far as the mid-2020s. The first set is benign and includes “The Status Quo” and a “Western
Path to Development.” The second set is malignant
and includes what has been called, “Stalin Lite,” i.e.,
a return to a limited police state at home and revisionism abroad. It also includes what amounts to a
worst case scenario, “Russia in Chaos,” where central authority is weak, the economy is dysfunctional,
violence widespread, and de facto fiefdoms based on
ethnic, ideological, regional, and religious divisions
proliferate. Under these turbulent and unpredictable
circumstances, all of Eurasia is at risk but the primary
focus will be upon American-Russian relations.
In looking at the set of benign outcomes, the following observations are pertinent.
The Status Quo: In spite of a multitude of challenges—economic, political and social—the Power
Vertical prevails with or without Vladimir Putin’s
stewardship. The relationship between the West and
Russia remains problematic, although there are notably areas of cooperation.
The Western Path to Development: Under
mounting pressure from progressive members of his
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team and business oligarchs, as well as a revitalized
“democracy movement” and discontent among the
provincials, Putin reluctantly retreats and paves the
way for a more open political system and law-based
society. Prospects for close relations with the West improve dramatically and make possible the integration
of an enlarged Europe, including Russia.
In addressing the second set of malignant scenarios, the following observations are pertinent.
Stalin Lite: In keeping with the crackdown that
began soon after Putin was elected in 2012, a host of
opposition figures are arrested, a number of oligarchs
flee the country, new restraints are imposed upon the
media, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and
members of the inner circle whose loyalty is suspect
are removed from office. Intercommunal violence is on
the rise throughout Russia, not only in the North Caucasus. Simultaneously, under the influence of Slavic
ultra-nationalists, the Kremlin lashes out at Azerbaijan, the Baltics, Georgia, and Ukraine. “East-West relations” take on the aspects of a “new cold war,” but the
Kremlin overlords acknowledge that the correlation
of forces favors the West, and it is foolhardy to risk a
military confrontation with the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) or its member states. In short,
they adhere to “red lines” that they will not cross.
Russia in Chaos: A multitude of rival factions divide the Kremlin overlords, while disparate ethnic,
religious and regional actors dominate a host of fiefdoms that challenge Moscow’s authority. Meanwhile,
the military and police have become dysfunctional and
their members demoralized. In some cases, they have
joined the disparate armed groups that are responsible
for widespread violence. Under these circumstances,
Russia may fragment in much the same fashion that
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) did.
8

Russian-watchers deem this outcome implausible but
should it materialize, it will have monumental and
dangerous implications for international stability and
force U.S. strategists to take another look at Russia. In
contrast to the Stalin Lite scenario, the major players—
out of design or happenstance—are prepared to take
risks and actions that may foster violent conflicts with
Russia’s neighbors and Western allies in the former
Soviet space.
Each of the scenarios will be considered to determine their impact upon Russia and the countries that
are adjacent to it in Eurasia—although the major focus
will be upon Europe. The implications for U.S.-Russian relations will receive special attention in each of
the four scenarios.
Pertinent questions that need to be answered
include the following:
•	Why will Russia continue to be a major concern
of the American foreign policy community?
•	
What are the prospects for fruitful cooperation between the United States and Russia on a
range of critical international problems?
•	What issues at present are most favorable to cooperation between the two countries?
•	Why, since 2007, has Putin concluded that the
United States can no longer dictate to Russia
but must treat it like an equal, and what impact
will his crackdown have upon the prospects for
fruitful cooperation with the Barack Obama administration?
•	What are the domestic U.S. barriers to a re-engagement with Russia?
•	In looking at the four scenarios under scrutiny, what are their significance for stability
in Europe and harmonious American-Russian
relations?
9

•  How does China influence the prospects for
positive American-Russian relations?
•Why must the United States seek a partnership
with Russia on addressing crises like Syria,
Iran and North Korea and not embrace a pause
in relations as some analysts recommend?
		
THE STATUS QUO
The Domestic Prospect.
By the close of 2012, analysts predicting Putin’s
demise were having second thoughts. His popularity
was slumping, but he still enjoyed a 60 percent favorability rating in the polls. Democratic leaders everywhere would characterize such staunch support as a
“ruling mandate.” The principle reason for this reassessment was that in face of his crackdown, most protestors returned to the comfort of their homes. Wags
in Moscow proclaimed, “They forgot about revolution
and went shopping!”
There was much about Putin’s meteoric rise that
baffled Kremlin-watchers. He was born and educated
in Leningrad and, after graduating with a law degree,
he entered the KGB. He served for 4 years in the East
German city of Dresden where, according to his biographers, one of his major duties was to monitor the activities of those German comrades who clashed with
Eric Honecker, the reactionary leader who earned
Moscow’s enmity for resisting the liberal reforms that
Gorbachev had championed in the USSR and urged
Moscow’s satellites to follow. Was Putin working
with the dissidents in a Kremlin orchestrated plot to
dump Honecker? If so, he might have been a much

10

more substantial member of the KGB than his resume
otherwise indicated.
In 1990 he returned to his hometown, and in 3
years, he hopscotched from being an aide to St. Petersburg’s Mayor Sobchak, his former law professor,
to much bigger things in Moscow. After Sobchak had
lost his bid for re-election, Putin went to work in the
President’s office; was appointed head of the FSB (the
new name for the KGB); became deputy prime minister; and served as acting prime minister before he
replaced Yeltsin as president.
It appears that Putin, while in St. Petersburg, had
developed the capacity to serve as an interlocutor between the government and the new business oligarchs
that had become powerful players in political as well
as economic affairs in the midst of post-Soviet turmoil.
Presumably, one of the reasons why he was selected
to replace Yeltsin was to make sure that the oligarchs
did not break the arrangement that the Kremlin had
made with them: “Take whatever you could get your
hands on in the economic realm but do not meddle in
the political realm.”5
After his third successful run for the presidency,
Putin adopted new laws and procedures that intimidated his opponents—curtailing public protests by
making it more difficult to conduct them legally, by
denying NGO activists access to foreign funding,
by redefining the word “traitorous,” and by censoring bloggers, to name several of them. Even the
toothless Duma attracted his attention; for example,
Gennadi V. Gudkov, a rare member of the parliament who challenged the government, was removed
from office on the ground that he had engaged in
“criminal behavior.”6
In March, the residencies of Navalny, Sobchak,
and several other protest leaders were stormed and
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their contents rifled. Criminal charges were leveled
against Navalny and the leftist fire-brand Sergei
Udaltsov, clearly a prologue for worse things to come.
Furthermore, one of the latter’s associates, Leonid
Razvozzhayev, who fled to Kiev to avoid arrest, was
kidnapped and returned to a Russian prison. He had
arranged a transit to Israel with a Jewish agency but,
while taking a break in his meeting with its representatives, he was snatched by Russian agents and taken
home where he was accused of visa irregularities.
Shaken by the crackdown, most protestors vacated the streets and resorted to less provocative enterprises, while their titular leaders vainly searched for
a new strategy. Like the architects of the Arab Spring,
they turned to the Internet and formed a Coordinating Council of 45 activists. Navalny, who had gained
notoriety by claiming Putin’s United Russia was “the
party of thieves and crooks,” was chosen its leader.
It included representatives from all factions, although
the cosmopolitans predominated. Their purpose was
to remove Putin from power but, when asked how
they intended to accomplish that daunting objective,
their answers were vague.
Nonetheless many foreign observers were sanguine about their prospects. After all, the Arab Spring
had demonstrated the capacity of grassroots protesters to shape political events with the help of the new
information technology that was available to ordinary
citizens. Putin controlled the media, but because he
did not use computers and dismissed the power of cell
phones and social networking, he was operating in the
dark surrounded by “yes men.” Granted it would take
time, but the handwriting was on the wall; the days of
the Power Vertical were numbered.7
Some Russian commentators were less optimistic,
citing overwhelming evidence that the reformers had
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failed to live up to expectations. Navalny was characterized as a windbag whose nationalistic affiliations
unsettled the democrats; the Council was denigrated
as a Potemkin-like fraud; and there was ample evidence that the reformers were demoralized. Meanwhile, Putin continued his crackdown and, while it
did not silence the likes of Navalny and Udaltsov, it
intimidated ordinary disgruntled members of the urban middle class. They had little stomach for a confrontation with Putin’s security services. Holding
well-paying jobs and having access to the good life
that had been denied their parents, not many of them
were prepared to take risks. Yes, they were unhappy
with the government, but if the average Russian did
not butt heads with the authorities, they left you alone
and your private affairs were your own business.
What other Russian generation could make a similar
statement?
Putin’s harsh policies were accompanied by a
populist campaign as he appeared before audiences of
workers to commiserate with them. He even met with
members of motorcycle gangs that celebrated Russian
chauvinism and vehemently attacked non-Russians.
They did so with special zeal in the case of Muslims.
Moreover, while sophisticated Muscovites lamented
the jail sentence for two young women who belonged
to the Pussy Riot rock group that had conducted a
bizarre display of contempt for Putin in Moscow’s
Church of the Redeemer, most ordinary folk applauded the punishment.
Putin displayed a unique gift for exploiting the
wide cultural chasm that separated the cosmopolitans
and the provincials through his populist rhetoric and
widely circulated visuals: his stalking wild animals,
searching for archeological treasure in ocean depths,
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and flying in flimsy aircraft guiding migratory birds
to a safe refuge. He often performed these feats shirtless or in macho sports togs. Critics made fun of such
displays, but Putin knew that “simple” folk liked it
when their leaders acted and talked tough. Millions of
Russians still recalled with approval his threat to kill
Chechen terrorists in their outdoor “shit-houses.”
They also were delighted by his attacks on American officials interfering in Russia’s domestic affairs.
Days after arriving in Moscow, the new American
Ambassador, Michael McFaul—a Stanford University professor and one of the major proponents of the
reset—was stalked by a TV crew, sending a message
from the Kremlin that his mission in Moscow was not
going to be pleasant. Also, Putin named Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton a “foreign provocateur” bent on
achieving regime change in Russia. Such claims resonated among ordinary folk and so did accusations that
the reformers were nothing less than “foreign agents”
who were seeking the government’s overthrow. Even
some Russians who scoffed at such tactics were disturbed by what they deemed American efforts to humiliate Russia. In his public appearances, Putin often
reminded onlookers that the Americans were not in
a position to preach to anyone. How could they do
so when the 2000 presidential election was stolen; or
demonize Russia for corruption when the global financial crisis orchestrated by Wall Street represented
the most massive act of corruption ever? And human
rights—well, every day the evidence was overwhelming that the Americans in their endless wars were the
major perpetrators of such abhorrent practices, and
what about the U.S. prison population—said to be the
largest in the world?
By year’s end, Kremlin-watchers concluded that
predictions of Putin’s imminent political demise were
14

baseless. On the contrary, not only would he survive
until 2018, his health willing, he might ride a third
term into the 2020s. Yes, there were many reasons for
complaints, but no one could deny Russians were living better than ever, could travel abroad, and they did
not have to worry about clumsy government intrusions into their daily lives. Putin gave them a psychological jolt by once again making them proud of their
country. In sum, since Putin was in charge, things had
changed for the better. All one had to do was reflect
on recent history.
In the aftermath of the USSR’s disintegration,
“Russia’s gross domestic product [GDP] contracted
by as much as 35-45 percent.”8 In contrast to the Soviet Union’s last year, living standards collapsed by
46 percent and, after its demise, Russia was stricken
by a budget deficit and a ruble devaluation that devastated personal wealth. It was no surprise, then, that
voters expressed little enthusiasm for Boris Yeltsin,
who eagerly embraced foreign inspired economic
bromides—e.g., the “shock therapy” that was associated with American free market radicals. The aging
and sickly Yeltsin’s incompetence was compounded
by his complicity in the “great robbery” that he tolerated—nay participated in—with a small group of
grasping oligarchs. It resulted in a colossal heist of
national wealth, pandemic corruption, and economic
hard times for just about everybody except the new
Nomenklatura.
“Then, as if by magic, everything seemed to begin changing in 1999.”9 Henceforth the nation’s GDP
grew by an annual rate of 7 percent, incomes soared
for many, the budget deficit plunged, and Russia
settled its foreign debt obligations. On the political
front, Putin, who was named Prime Minister, was un-
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abashed in his pledge to the Russian people that he
would end their long, dark period of humiliation. Toward that end, he launched a second war in Chechnya
and crushed the “bandits” there and adopted tough
new measures to silence troublemakers, including the
most “assertive” oligarchs. The incarceration of Lukoil’s president, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, earned Putin
enmity outside of Russia but applause within it. In
Putin’s mind, and that of a majority of Russians, there
was a direct correlation between stability—authoritarianism—and prosperity. “Russia was back!”
Nonetheless, upon his 2012 return to the Presidential Palace, Putin had reason to look toward a third
term with trepidation. He agreed that his Achilles heel
was the “petro-state” where an entire nation rested on
a one-legged economy. He, too, endorsed the notion
of economic diversification but that entailed a real war
on corruption, a truly functional legal system, and other liberal measures that threaten the privileges of his
most powerful supporters. That meant taking on the
muscular collection of former security officers, military commanders, economic warlords, and criminal
elements that embraced the status quo. It had made
them rich and influential, and they saw no reason to
scrap it.
At the same time, abundant gas and oil profits in
the early-21st century were barriers to change just as
they were during the Soviet era. In the last years of its
existence, the Soviet Union’s hydrocarbon revenues
surged, and this windfall allowed the geriatric leadership to avoid one of the specters that haunted most of
them: the Soviet system’s implosion. Convinced that
oil and gas revenues would continue to flow, changes
in either the economic or political system were unnecessary. There was a sufficient supply of rubles to
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fund both the Warfare and Welfare State, or so they
reasoned, until hydrocarbon production faltered and
Mikhail Gorbachev was forced to acknowledge that
the USSR could not afford both “guns and butter.”
This all deteriorated during Yeltsin’s 10 years in
the Kremlin, but soon after Putin was appointed prime
minister, he counted on high energy prices to keep the
generals happy and through government transfers to
meet the needs of ordinary folk. Furthermore, Russia’s economic boom opened avenues of prosperity to
an expanding educated middle class. Life improved
as well for millions of other Russians who did not enjoy much formal education as they found jobs in construction, service industries, and other occupations
not directly tied to the energy boom. As the hard times
of the Yeltsin era were left behind them, the people
embraced the “Putin era.”10
But he hit a bump when the economic crisis of 2008
demonstrated how vulnerable Russia remained in the
face of dramatic changes in the global economy. Alexei Kudrin, who served as finance minister from 2000
to 2011, observed that Russia’s problems were a direct result of its dependence upon hydrocarbon rents.
“The oil industry” no longer was “a locomotive for the
economy” but had “become a brake.” This had been
the fate of any country that depended upon a single
commodity for prosperity. At the same time, economists predicted the output of energy assets would decline after 2020.11 If Russia was to become a modern
society capable of competing in the global economy,
it had to find wealth-producing opportunities other
than living on rents derived from natural resources.
That meant resurrecting industry, expanding the service sector, and investing in roads, air fields, and a
multitude of other infrastructure improvements. In his
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public remarks, Putin spoke in favor of diversification,
but he was reluctant to take the measures necessary to
accomplish that daunting objective. On the contrary,
his actions seemed to be in keeping with those in the
military-industrial complex that saw massive defense
spending as a force multiplier for the economy. Putin
was by far the most powerful man in Russia, but he
could not altogether ignore the disparate clans that
had the capacity to challenge him.
Analysts focusing on declining gas and oil rents,
however, had ignored a more positive picture: Russia still had abundant hydrocarbon wealth, and the
older energy fields were profitable if new techniques
were adopted. The large Western oil companies were
ready to provide the capital required to modernize
the depleted wells in western Siberia. What is more,
access to oil and gas fields in the Arctic were so attractive that foreign entrepreneurs would gladly invest in
them as well.
Kremlin officials believed that prices would firm up
as the global economy rebounded in 2013. In a pinch,
Putin could rely upon his ace in the hole: the world’s
third largest stockpile of hard currency. Should hydrocarbon revenues stall, Putin presumed that he had the
cash to meet the complaints of those in the hinterland
who expressed fears about their salaries and pensions.
Many remained silent because they accepted the Kremlin line that “Yes, we are facing hard times but so are
the Europeans who not only are struggling to save the
Euro but to salvage the EU [European Union] itself.”
Then, too, Russians throughout history had demonstrated they had a higher tolerance for pain than their
spoiled fellow Europeans. Consequently, Greeks and
Spaniards might be more inclined to press for regime
change than ordinary Russians. Even the arrogant
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Americans were having trouble addressing their gargantuan debt crisis and economic inequality there was
unprecedented. The U.S. media was percolating with
reports that the “American Dream” was beyond the
grasp of a growing number of U.S. citizens.
In Russia, by contrast, economic diversification
was taking place. One of Russia’s unheralded economic assets included a large pool of almost 150 million customers who craved the living standards of a
consumer economy that had long flourished in Europe
and the United States. Foreign investors were more
than happy to invest in an authoritarian “European”
country just as they had done so for decades in the
world’s most populated Asian autocracy—China. At
the same time, there were some positive signs on the
demographic front; deaths still exceeded births, but
migrants from many parts of the former USSR were
entering Russia in steady numbers. It was reported
that most of the workers building the Sochi Olympic
venue were from Central Asia. If this trend was sustained, it was good news for both Russia and those
who courted its consumers.
What’s more, Russia could claim with justification that it was on the road to diversification as rents
from oil and gas capitalized jobs in industry, construction, and the service sector. Reports from Nizhny
Novgorod indicated in late-2012 that GM would invest over $1 billion in upgrading Russian auto plants.
Foreign car sales were increasing at a rapid pace, and
it was projected that Russia would surpass Germany
as Europe’s largest car market. GM and other foreign
automakers were also establishing joint ventures with
Russian manufacturers such as Avtovaz. While economists focused on China and India as the leading BRIC
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(Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries when it
came to cars, Russia was in the lead.
There are now 250 cars for every 1,000 people in Russia, which places the country about midway between
emerging markets in Asia and developed markets in
Europe. By comparison, India has 11 cars for every
1,000 people; China 49, . . .”12

Of course, there were frequent expressions of discontent with the Power Vertical from the hinterland;
corruption along with pervasive lawlessness in business was one of the most serious threats to Putin and
his camp. But as long as there was sufficient revenue
to meet their basic needs, the provincials would not
take to the streets in large numbers. Simultaneously,
by granting the local economic and political elites
some concessions—such as a greater voice in matters
that affected their regions and a modest uptick in revenues from Moscow—they would not transform their
harsh rhetoric and threats to bolt from the federation
into resolute action.
“Bandits” continued to wage a low-level insurgency in the North Caucasus, but efforts on the part of
foreign jihadists to exploit Islamic discontent in Russia
had only achieved marginal results. Fears about Muslims and other minorities supporting independence
movements had not materialized to any significant
degree as the ethnic minority leadership calculated
that the risks of leaving Russia were greater than the
rewards of remaining within its boundaries. At the
same time, the disparate Islamic factions were at odds
with each other much as Sunni and Shiite were in
other parts of the Umma and nationalistic rivalry was
added to the mix.
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The International Prospect.
In 2007, Putin reversed a course of cooperation
with President George W. Bush when at the annual security affairs conference in Munich, Germany, he announced the end of the American unipolar moment;
henceforth his partner in Washington had to treat
him as an equal—not a supplicant—if Bush hoped
to work with him. By this time, Putin was not optimistic because he concluded that while Russia made
a number of concessions in the area of nuclear arms
control, Bush responded by scrapping the Cold War
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty and by proclaiming
plans for an anti-missile system in Europe. For Putin,
that was it; henceforth, he would only engage with his
counterparts in Washington if they gave him something in return for his concessions. He also acted as if
the Americans needed him more then he needed them.
Analysts in Washington retorted that by any measuring stick, Russia was not a military equal to the
United States, and Putin’s international ambitions
were out of sync with his nation’s capabilities. Yes, it
had a nuclear arsenal only second to the United States,
a veto at the UN, and controlled massive territory to
shape global affairs. Consequently, it could make life
difficult for the West as it had in the case of Syria,
but in any assessment of the “correlation of forces”
between the United States and Russia, all one had to
do was to Google “population,” “GDP,” and other
data that compared the two, and the United States
enjoyed an enormous advantage in shaping world affairs. Add the population, GDP, and other measures
of power of Washington’s allies in Europe and Asia,
and the “West’s” advantage was even more gargantuan. In a word, such musings indicated why Russia
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was of little interest to most members of Congress
and their constituents. What really concerned them
was the looming presence of China, not another failed
European empire.
Looking at Russia’s foreign policy priorities from
Putin’s perspective, however, one can reach a conclusion more favorable to him. He knows Russia will
never enjoy the power that the Soviet leaders did, and
this may explain why he gave Medvedev the American and European portfolios. He has no intention of
taking on the West in a serious showdown because
his most urgent foreign policy goal is regional, not international—although the region in question, the former Soviet space, is massive. Specifically, he wants to
re-integrate former Soviet entities back into Russia’s
clutches and to deny the West the capacity to integrate
them into the EU and NATO. Using this measuring
stick, Putin’s foreign policy agenda shows promise as
many analysts in Eastern Europe remind their American counterparts.
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, the countries
of most immediate concern to the foreign ministry,
may challenge Putin at times, but in the final analysis, he has significant influence over all three of them.
While Belarus and Kazakhstan are deemed important
to Moscow, control over Ukraine is a must for Russia. Without control of Ukraine, any effort on Russia’s
part to throw its weight around in Eurasia is placed in
peril. Ukraine no longer expresses interest in NATO,
although Moscow is not happy about its attraction
to the EU. Russian analysts, of course, have reason
to conclude that just as infighting among the democrats in Ukraine paved the way for the election of a
pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, those in
control of Kiev today will fail in their bid for EU mem-
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bership as a consequence of their own ineptitude and
political ambitions.
Simultaneously, Georgia remains committed to
NATO membership but since the Five-Day War, the
major European powers, and the United States as
well, have retreated from a campaign to find a place
for it in the alliance. It is with this observation in mind,
that the Russians can claim that, while foreign observers have dwelt upon their army’s difficulties and
shortfalls in waging the 2008 war, in the final analysis,
they won it.
Officials in the Russian foreign ministry also can
take comfort in the fact that they dominate the TransDniester and Armenia and have significant influence
in Moldova. What is more, through its powerful business interests, Russia has the means to influence the
cultural, economic and political affairs of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and some East European countries
that were former Soviet satellites.
In short, throughout the 1990s and early-2000s
Moscow devoted much of its foreign policy energy
and funds to transforming its former Soviet empire
into a sphere of influence.13
Once many of the targeted countries gained EU
and NATO membership, this campaign fell short, but
Russian interests play an important part in their politics, economy, and media. Ambitious young businessmen in Eastern Europe are once again finding it useful
to speak Russian and profitable to court Russian companies that control banks, media outlets, and most energy enterprises. The political elite in all of these countries cannot be unmindful of their large neighbor to
the east, especially as the EU wrestles with persistent
economic problems and Euro-Skeptics gain electoral
support among their disgruntled populations.
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Former Soviet entities that now belong to the EU
can rely upon its assistance, but the EU is not always
forthcoming. For years, powerful business interests—
especially but not exclusively in Germany—resented
the ability of the new members to influence profitable deals with Russia; as yet, the EU has failed to
develop a truly comprehensive energy security policy
to protect them from the power of Gazprom; Brussels, Belgium also has turned its back on Moscow’s
capacity to influence internal economic and political
affairs through deals that local entrepreneurs “cannot afford to refuse.” Today, preoccupation with the
debt and Euro crisis has compelled some EU members to placate the Russians on their own, and logic
dictates that in the process they must make concessions favorable to what in Soviet days they called their
“elder brother.”14
In looking toward Putin’s foreign policy priorities,
he is pursuing several important interrelated goals:
•	
Deny former Soviet Republics in the near
abroad the opportunity to follow the Baltic Republics into NATO and the EU; Belarus, Georgia, and Ukraine in particular.
•	Instead, incorporate them, as well as the Central Asia states, into economic and security
systems dominated by Moscow—e.g., Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and
a new Eurasian Economic Union.
•	Join China in a grand strategy to present the
Americans with a firewall in every part of
Eurasia, and do the same in denying Washington successful attempts to achieve regime
change throughout Eurasia and the Greater
Middle East. Of course, Moscow will avoid
any effort on Beijing’s part to treat Russia like a
junior partner.
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•	Cooperate with the West in some areas of common concern: nuclear proliferation, Islamic terrorism, and other threats to both camps. But in
contrast to Yeltsin, Putin will demand compensation in return: e.g., have a voice in the American anti-missile system in Europe and provide
Russia with a voice in efforts to address the
crises in Iran and Syria. With Pakistan on the
verge of civil war, the Americans may lean
more heavily upon the Northern Distribution
Network in their exit from Afghanistan than
the perilous southern route through Pakistan.15
This scenario is the “most plausible” since it represents current circumstances and may endure even
if Putin is no longer in charge. Some may question
using the word “benign” to describe it since Putin is
doing things deserving of a more negative connotation. But in defense of this designation, civil society is
alive in Russia, although under assault. There are independent newspapers, and radio and TV outlets that
consistently criticize Putin and his associates. And, of
course, there is the Internet that not only reaches the
educated through English language material but increasingly in Russian. The Kremlin has taken steps to
neutralize it, but it continues to flourish. From time to
time, the Kremlin and Putin’s policies are subjectively
scrutinized by media that is under the control of the
ruling class.
The status quo may persist essentially unchanged
for years but there are signs that it may presage the
second most likely outcome: Stalin Lite that is deserving of the “malignant” designation. But before
looking at it, what about the other “benign” scenario,
that is, The Western Path to Development? It will be
discussed next.
25

THE WESTERN PATH TO DEVELOPMENT
The Domestic Prospect.
This outcome rests upon the conventional wisdom
among Kremlin-watchers that the collapse of Russia’s
“one-legged” petro-economy and a surge in grassroots opposition to the Power Vertical are preconditions for Russia adopting a Western path to development—a free market economy, democratic polity, and
pluralistic social system. Consider, therefore, the following train of events.
As a result of technological breakthroughs, the
United States surges ahead of Russia as the world’s
leading exporter of natural gas and sells it for a price
Gazprom cannot match. At the same time, by harvesting its enormous sand tar deposits, Canada provides
petroleum on the global market at prices that Russian
oil companies cannot match. In sum, North America’s energy windfall undercuts the financial base
of the hardliners in the Kremlin and opens the door
for those who advocate a Western path to Russia’s
development.
During much of Putin’s reign, Gazprom, the country’s largest business enterprise accounted for almost
10 percent of Russia’s GDP, 500,000 jobs, and 20 percent of the state’s budget. But in the last quarter of
2012, its profits plunged 50 percent as “customers
slashed orders and negotiated price discounts (China,
for one) worth $4 billion in 2012 alone. . . . ”16 Under
these circumstances, the company and the Russian
government lost the capacity to dictate terms to its customers and neighboring governments. Oil rents also
declined, and that trend had a profound impact upon
Russia’s budget since profits depended upon selling a
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barrel for about $115. Unfortunately, the world market settled upon a price far lower than that figure.
There was additional bad news for the reactionaries that depended upon energy wealth to dominate Russia: the long-expected drive to diversify the
economy stalled as many investors—domestic and
foreign—concluded that Russia remained a corrupt,
lawless, dysfunctional society. Money could be made
there but only at grave risk as many foreign firms adhered to rules that their Kremlin-connected Russian
counterparts brazenly ignored. Among the oligarchs
and their confederates, profits from energy represented easy pickings, while a truly energetic drive toward
economic diversification would involve real entrepreneurial skills and uncertain profits. Even more unsettling, the subsequent shift in commerce would create
new centers of influence that the oligarchs could not
control; naturally, they balked at diversification for
this reason alone.
Putin spoke incessantly about finding new areas
of economic activity, lest Russia end up like other
“petro-states” that ultimately faced economic doom
when their gas and oil revenues slumped. But facts
on the ground did not support his rhetoric. Russia’s
failure to diversify was exemplified by the following
observation:
Rapacious officeholders have reinforced the country’s
dependence on the oil industry by strangling independent enterprise. Small businesses employing fewer
than 100 people make up less than 7 percent of Russia’s economy as compared with Poland, for example,
where they make up fully 50 percent.17

By design or happenstance, giant enterprises absorbed smaller firms and reduced, not enlarged, the
number of businesses in Russia.
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As a larger number of Russians from all walks
of life became victims of economic decline, displays
of political unrest surged and gave rise to new alliances that did not escape the attention of the more
clear-headed in the government and associated clans.
With revenues in a free-fall, the Kremlin found it exceedingly difficult to subsidize jobs and entitlements,
and efforts to fight corruption took a back seat to the
power elite’s survival. This fed widespread expressions of discontent at the grassroots—including the
hinterland where Putin had always been popular—
and gave regional elites a political base among the disgruntled provincials. For years, regional stakeholders
had pressed Moscow for a larger share of revenues
and a greater voice in their own political affairs, but
to no avail. Simultaneously, their constituents relied
upon the federal government for their economic security. But as the center proved unwilling or incapable
of providing jobs and safety nets to protect Russia’s
most vulnerable citizens, working people looked toward provincial elites for protection.
In Siberia, voices demanding outright breaks with
the rest of Russia became more resonant. The federal bureaucrats, thousands of miles away, exploited
wealth extracted from Siberian land, but its residents
received crumbs in return. Local economic and political elites henceforth struck deals with their Asian
neighbors and, in the process, found economic alternatives to Moscow. As a consequence, they kept much
of the wealth that was produced in Russia’s Far East.
Elsewhere, minority communities acted in a similar
fashion and ethnic communal pride served as a force
multiplier in clashes with their “Russian masters.”
The jihadists in the North Caucasus attracted new recruits, and in many places they enjoyed de facto, if not

28

de jure, independence. Here was further evidence that
the hardliners in the Kremlin were incapable of keeping Russia whole.
The task of providing the military with funds to
procure new weapon systems and to improve the quality of life for the troops and their families became even
more daunting. Despite shrinking numbers, it became
difficult to arm and train the troops; consequently,
morale among enlisted men and officers plunged,
causing grave concern about their loyalty. Defense
tycoons objected to cuts in the military budget, and
their disgruntled workers frequently did so through
violent protest—occupying factories, blocking bridges
and tunnels and halting auto and train traffic.
In addition to the revival of massive street demonstrations, the democrats were busy building a new
movement that favored a Western, pluralistic world
view. The 2011-12 demonstrations represented the
“tip of the iceberg,” but below it loomed a gathering
force of grassroots power. Even after the cosmopolitans spurned massive street protests, they continued
to organize and expand civil society through the Internet. Working in the most promising sectors of the
economy, a growing legion of Russians—including
young people who attended school, worked, and vacationed in Europe and the United States—was creating a counterculture and a narrative that aped the
values and worldview integral to Western pluralism.
NGOs that provided the underpinning for volunteerism swept the country. Attempts to deny them
foreign funding had a minimal impact upon their
operations as they turned to domestic alternatives to
expand a social network of like-minded people. While
the State was moving toward the autocratic right, the
most consequential members of society were lurching
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toward the democratic left. As one Russian Internet
portal manager noted, “. . . formations of a new sort
are being created within” the larger civil society. As
the Arab Spring demonstrated, the Internet made it
possible for democracy to flourish even in societies
that were not democratic. The government controlled
TV and adhered to an information strategy that rested upon the old Soviet formula of deceit, deception,
and disinformation, but through the Web and “smart
phones” millions of Russians had access to the truth
and, in turn, through social networking passed it onto
friends, neighbors, and other Web users. The Internet
was a game changer upon which the Russian democrats were banking to lead their country down the
road to an open, law-based society. It was estimated
that by 2014 close to 70 percent of the country’s adults
would have Internet access. What is more, “Russia’s
largest Internet portals” had “already caught up with
several federal television channels” in terms of users.
The Kremlin, therefore, conceded that the Internet
had become the major instrument of citizen “selforganization.”18 As a consequence, there was a spike
in the arrest of bloggers and censorship of them. But
that campaign fizzled when security agents pointed
out that it was helping the democrats in their recruitment drive, while economists warned that attempts
to neutralize the Internet would harm the economy at
the very time it was experiencing mounting problems.
It was through the Internet, moreover, that thousands of Russians in the diaspora contributed to the
growth of civil society back home. Here, again, popular pro-democratic uprisings in the Arab world came
to mind. As one Russian analyst noted:
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the participation of immigrants from Arab countries
who were in Europe had an impact on the online agitation during the ‘Arab Spring’ and on the coverage of
these events in the West. Immigrant bloggers created
a sort of bridge that brought Western values and standards to their compatriots, who had no other opportunity to learn about democracy and human rights.19

Much the same thing was happening in Russia,
and as the authorities lost their nerve, the dissidents
became bolder and more relentless in demanding
democratic reforms.
At the same time as the cosmopolitans ditched
their Moscow-centric mindset, they discovered a large
pool of talented and courageous leaders living outside the large cities who could articulate the dreams
and grievances of their neighbors—if provided with
the means to do so. This insight prompted the urban
activists to collaborate with provincial leaders, and
together they crafted alliances that the Kremlin could
not ignore. Modest financial, legal, and organizational
assistance enabled grassroots activists in the hinterland to construct community organizations that recruited people who previously had remained outside
of politics. It was this specter that prompted Kremlin
propagandists in 2012 to complain that Lithuania was
providing venues for Western experts to train Russian
agitators in the art of community organizing.
As was true of the Arab Spring, the young computer savvy generation and the growing legion of Russians in the diaspora introduced their elders to this
new world of independent information. Of course,
many of Russia’s new rich vacationed in the West, had
homes there, and favored American and European
banks to protect their cash assets. They took comfort
in the thought that should things get dicey for them at
31

home, they could find refuge in London or Manhattan. If they chose exile, they would have to live in societies where the rule of law prevailed, but that was not
a serious deterrent since many of them had learned
how to use their wealth to protect their interests. They
did so by buying the best legal talent in London or
most politically wired public relations (PR) firms on K
Street. American investigative reporters or enterprising analysts who uncovered malfeasance on the part
of a Russian energy giant, for example, were silenced
by a mere letter of warning from a powerful law firm
in one of the Western capitals since they rarely had
the financial heft to take on the oligarchs. Were Russia to become a truly pluralistic country, its new rich
would have to take risks, but inaction would produce
an even more uncertain future for them.
As more Kremlin insiders concluded their fate
was tethered to the nation’s best and brightest and
disgruntled elements that were demanding change,
Putin demonstrated his pragmatism and appointed
Alexei Kudrin as Prime Minister. This surprised some
Kremlin watchers since Kudrin openly denigrated
some of Putin’s most cherished policies. “I’m against
the constant anti-Western rhetoric,” he told a Spiegel
interviewer, “even if it’s only intended for domestic ears. It’s detrimental to the modernization of our
economy, and of course it doesn’t help make Moscow
a global financial center.” And in spite of the crackdown, he observed that while there were no longer
massive street demonstrations, “A new active civil
society has developed.”20
Henceforth, policies associated with economic and
political revisionists were adopted: they included a
stable ruble; checks on inflation; protecting property
rights and contracts; fighting corruption; and reduc-
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ing the country’s defense budget. They also provided
for free elections, the formation of opposition political parties, an independent media, effective anti-corruption measures and other major features prevalent
in a law-based democratic polity. As these changes
took place, domestic and foreign entrepreneurs began to invest in Russia while expanding existing
joint ventures.
In sum, this pivot toward pluralism contributed
to the appearance of a vibrant and expanding civil
society, spearheaded by a pro-democracy movement
that prompted even skeptics to conclude that Russia was on the road to pluralism. It did not appear
overnight and encountered stiff crosswinds, but it
took root over time because the Western path to development was the only one that provided change
without bloodshed.
The International Prospect.
Several international developments helped reconfigure power relationships within Russia. In the aftermath of the USSR’s demise, Putin had cited economic
turmoil in the West to chastise rivals who championed
American economic bromides. After all, the “bad
years” of the 1990s were a product of Yeltsin’s slavishly listening to American free market radicals that
resulted in the 1998 crash. It, in turn, prompted a soft
coup a year later when the Siloviki compelled Yeltsin
to name Putin as his Prime Minister.
The George W. Bush administration demonstrated
that American capitalism was corrupt and had fostered gross economic inequality and the worst international economic crisis since the Great Depression. It
was responsible for a debt crisis that would plague the

33

American economy for a decade or more. Obama saw
the economic challenge somewhat differently, but he,
too, championed the free market and accommodated
Wall Street before he turned to the ills of Main Street.
Europe’s debt crisis, likewise, demonstrated the
flaws of the EU and was responsible for unprecedented
joblessness, declining public revenues, and plunging
profits. Eventually economic stagnation would doom
the “European project” and empower Euro-skeptics
who demanded their nations break with the EU altogether. David Cameron, the United Kingdom’s (UK)
Prime Minister, was not the only European leader that
harbored profound reservations about EU membership. At the same time, the new members from the
East received a proportionately smaller share of development funds than the larger ones—so much for
economic equality. Here again was further evidence
that the Western model of development was outmoded and if Russia followed it, the outcome would
be perilous.
Meanwhile, the world’s most robust economy was
thriving under the direction of men in Beijing that
shared much in common with Putin regarding the
“shortfalls” of Western-style democracy and capitalism. China enjoyed double-digit rates of growth for a
quarter century, and its economy would soon be larger than its American counterpart. For many Russians
who had reservations about liberal economic doctrine,
the Chinese offered an alternative that many inside
the Kremlin favored.
But as Russia encountered rough economic seas,
a number of global developments occurred that challenged this condemnation of the West. For example,
with a rebound in the American economy and expectations that by 2020 the United States would be-

34

come energy independent, the campaign to denigrate
the American modernization model lost credibility.
Abundant energy in North America produced an upswing in manufacturing and a surge in other sectors
resulting in dramatic job growth, escalating wages and
plunging public debt. In spite of a protracted partisan
dust-up over the debt crisis, investors worldwide once
again saw the U.S. as a safe profit-making center.21
Although the European recovery took longer, the creation of a true union with a strong central authority
and associated economic institutions fostered a spike
in economic activity throughout Europe. The process
was painful, but the turnaround was predictable; after
all, pundits proclaiming Europe’s inevitable decline
forgot that the EU was in competition with China and
the United States for the title of “the world’s largest
economy.” Under these circumstances, Russia’s economic oligarchs and political leaders alike sought
closer association with their European brethren.
This pivot was bolstered as the Chinese model lost
its luster. The long-anticipated showdown between its
energetic and expanding middle class and the communist Mandarins had commenced. Joined by a number
of wealthy entrepreneurs and some revisionists in the
Communist Party, they demanded a voice in political
affairs that the leadership was not prepared to provide. To make matters worse, several hundred million
displaced peasants who had entered the cities no longer were prepared to accept low wages and abysmal
working conditions in silence. Numerous people had
lost their jobs to low-wage workers elsewhere in Africa, Asia, and Central America, and their plight was
another source of concern for the troubled communist
leadership.
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Ordinary citizens were especially outraged that
the promises made by the new leaders in 2012 under
the stewardship of Xi Jinping fell far short of their
goals. In a growing number of instances, small entrepreneurs shuttered their enterprises and took to the
streets to protest their corrupt leaders. Under these
circumstances, violent protests became commonplace.
They were given added weight by reports of desertions among the police and even in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Foreign intelligence services indicated that the communist leadership ultimately had
to give ground to demands among the middle class
for real political influence, but many hardliners would
not do so without a fight. In anticipation of that showdown, some analysts conjured up the prospects of
mass revolt or a coup among the ruling elite.22 These
developments had a profound impact upon Russian
fans of “the Chinese miracle.” With growing unrest
in China and the prospects of serious violent confrontation there, Russian hardliners lost a major rationale
for their claim that the Western road to modernization
was an economic dead end and a source of political
instability.
Of course, globalization was the most consequential international development for Russia, but it was
a two-edged sword. It had enhanced the life of the
Power Vertical by producing a steady demand for energy exports, but it exposed the economy to disruptive international forces. With a dramatic uptick in
alternative sources of gas and oil as exemplified by
technological breakthroughs in North America, Russia faced stiff competition for its customers. This resulted in protracted economic difficulties that made
it impossible for Moscow to intimidate its neighbors
by playing the energy card. At the same time, without
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huge profit margins, the costs of corruption became
even more difficult to ignore.
The democrats urged the Kremlin to take note. In
the 21st century, no country could rely upon its own
resources or policies to foster economic prosperity.
Even the richest ones had to abide by the dictates of
the marketplace and the rules of the international economic regimes that had emerged in the closing years
of the 20th century. At the same time, there was reason for optimism; Russia possessed a vast storehouse
of hydrocarbon wealth, arable land, clean water, and
abundant minerals and timber. Its immense territory
also served as an expanding crossroads of trade and
transportation throughout Eurasia. What was missing
was a modern polity that mobilized the masses behind
a national campaign that enabled Russia to actualize
its immense potential. In a word, a democratic, lawbased polity would enhance the government’s capacity to exploit all of these assets with the people’s active
support. Conversely, a march back toward autocracy
was a dead end.
Here, then, was a road that promised prosperity
and a foundation upon which a strong state rested. It
would provide Russia with the opportunity to conduct its foreign relations from a position of strength,
while at the same time exploit soft power as a useful
diplomatic asset. Putin had been relentless in his campaign to enhance soft power, but he failed to realize
that it and autocracy are mutually exclusive phenomenon. Clear-headed members of Russia’s ruling elite
realized that Moscow could not force its neighbors to
surrender their sovereignty and suffer under Russian
rule the way they did under the USSR. But Putin was
right in that many of the countries identified with the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) remain
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attracted to the Russian language, Russian culture,
and shared experiences that preceded the Soviet Empire. But he failed to acknowledge that Russia did not
have to force itself upon its neighbors but rather let
nature run its course, the same way that the Mexicans
and Canadians came to grips with American power.23
On the other hand, a liberal Russia would have a
significant and benign impact upon neighboring countries. In face of expanding Russian democracy, there
would be a marked improvement in U.S.-Russian
relations, making security cooperation on a range of
matters plausible. For example, this could be an agreement covering the deployment of the American antimissile system in Europe; curbing the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD); upgrading the
New Start Treaty; resolving crises through the UN like
those pertaining to Syria and Iran; stabilizing a postU.S. 2014 Afghanistan; and moving toward Russia’s
membership in a new Euro-Atlantic security system.
Arguably this “best case” scenario does not represent the forecast of most Russian-watchers, but there
is justification for it. A growing number of economic
and political elites are now openly displaying reservations about the Power Vertical’s capacity to survive.
Similar conclusions prompted the Polish communists
and later their Russian comrades to throw in the towel
and not crush their opponents in a military Armageddon. The pivotal actors among the ruling class have
not, as yet, made a decision about their next move. But
as the younger generation gains access to economic
and political centers of power, it is likely that a critical
mass of the population will conclude that the status
quo is unsustainable.
In spite of ominous trends, civil society is alive
in Russia, and the cosmopolitans still feel comfort-
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able attacking Putin and his colleagues. This is why
Russia’s democratic activists brush aside the present
“dark days” and claim that real politics has taken root
in their country and eventually those responsible for
it will gain power as Russia retreats from autocracy.
Many of Russia’s most influential people, including
some associated with the Power Vertical, are convinced that a more democratic political system will
better enable Russia to actualize its huge economic
potential. Should Russia move in this direction, the
prospects for a rebalance in U.S.-Russian relations will
improve dramatically, and that outcome will have a
positive aspect upon an international system that faces multiple sources of instability and turbulence.
The Euro-Atlantic community can only help Russia achieve a democratic outcome on the margins, but
it must find ways to work with the current leadership. The collapse of European communism was not
a consequence of a hands-off policy but a by-product
of internal forces and Western interaction with the
communist Nomenklatura. Before Russia moves with
purpose towards pluralism—and it will not happen
overnight but step-by-step and will suffer some setbacks—it is likely to be preceded by a period of repression that exceeds the present status quo. This interregnum may be necessary since the coming of age of a
new generation is one of the major preconditions for a
pluralist Russia to take root. It is imperative then that
the West maintain, nay dramatically increases, faceto-face interaction with ordinary Russians through
cultural, educational and athletic events in addition to
formal diplomatic and military-to-military channels.
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STALIN LITE
The Domestic Aspect.
Putin was re-elected president in 2012 and the remaining Technocrats in the Kremlin were replaced
by Siloviki hardliners. Russian-watchers claimed that
henceforth, Putin would share power with them. They
had endorsed his crackdown but claimed that he had
not gone far enough in his war against “Russia’s”
enemies. As the economy faltered, they became even
more critical of his stewardship and reasoned that
he was incapable of effectively managing it. Claiming the country was facing a “national emergency,”
the new government adopted a system of rule that
some observers labeled Stalin Lite—that is a quasipolice state.24
In truth, the major culprit was a steep free-fall in
hydrocarbon revenues. Since they accounted for half
of the state’s income, the government was forced to
slash salaries, pensions, and other public transfers. As
an array of social service programs were cut, a rising
tide of discontent erupted among a broad cross section
of society. The rich and the privileged middle class—
as was true in many Western countries—continued to
enjoy security in face of growing economic inequality,
occupied pockets of prosperity and enjoyed political
clout that even the ruling elite could not ignore. But
the rest of society saw a plunge in living standards.
The most destitute were the 21st- century Lumpernprolitariat—victims of globalization and automation—
who no longer possessed skills relevant to the modern
world and could not survive on wages common in
Africa, Asia, and parts of Latin America. Eventually,
their anger spilled out into the streets in the form of
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strikes and violent actions that alarmed the Kremlin.
In some instances, the police joined the protestors
in demanding higher wages and better benefits of
their own.
As the defense budget suffered considerable hits,
the Kremlin was alarmed by protests from the armed
forces and civilian members of the military-industrial
complex. Under these circumstances, many Siloviki
concluded that Putin had lost his grip and something
dramatic had to be done to stabilize the situation. In
what some observers depicted as a return to a “command economy,” the government tightened control
of business, financial, and commercial practices. The
priority was no longer growth or vain attempts at
economic diversification but stability and control.
Foreign critics said by returning to a police state, the
Siloviki were living in a fantasy world as these odious
measures would only make things worse.
Meanwhile, on the political front, liberals, some
leftists, and anti-Kremlin nationalists were being arrested and imprisoned in expanding numbers, while
others who had not reached an accommodation with
the Kremlin chose exile or refuge in silence. Some
observers predicted that repression would backfire;
the people were no longer afraid and would respond
in massive protests. The authorities responsible for
this new more odious crackdown were simply out of
touch with the mood of the country. Kremlin officials
responded that it was the Western-oriented democrats
who lived in a bubble of their own. They had been so
seduced by pronouncements on the part of the Western media—“Putin’s days are numbered” and “the
people are no longer afraid”—that they ignored recent
historical lessons to the contrary. Repression works!
Recall in effect Stalin’s remark: “[E]liminate the agita-
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tor, and the problem goes away.” Conversely, it was
the failure of the hardliners in the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union (CPSU) to destroy Perestroika in its
crib that set in motion a stream of events that culminated in the Soviet Empire’s implosion. The Siloviki
in the 21st century would not make the same mistake.
Perhaps Putin’s days were numbered but not
those of his compatriots who were quarterbacking
the crackdown. Furthermore, the malcontents that
brazenly took to the streets earlier now were cowed
into silence. Like their parents and grandparents, they
were duly afraid of the mailed fist. The problem had
been that Putin had been too timid in deploying it, but
those now in charge would not make the same mistake. Long anticipated pesky opponents like Navalny
and Udalstov were put in jail on trumped-up criminal charges. They were joined by hundreds of other
leading opposition figures, and courageous journalists were being killed in a new round of assassinations
that presumably were being conducted by members
of organized crime or government agents—frequently, it was impossible to differentiate between the two.
Most ordinary folk in Russia accepted these measures
without comment.
Ethnic Russians in particular did so because they
feared the violence that had reached new levels of
mayhem in the North Caucasus would spread into
Russia proper. In the aftermath of Assad’s fall in Syria, Russian security officials discovered that many citizens from the North Caucasus that had fought in Syria
now were helping indigenous jihadists create a Caucasus Caliphate, and they were being joined by foreign terrorists as well. When the newly emboldened
Kremlin rulers embarked upon a campaign to crush
the insurgencies in the North Caucasus, they were applauded by most ethnic Russians.
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More and more insurgents had embraced the Green
of Islam. As was the case of earlier military operations,
this one resulted in wholesale human rights violations
and heavy civilian casualties. In justification, the authorities reminded the public that in addition to the
violence that these terrorist conducted in their own
region, they were responsible for bombing trains and
buildings in Russia proper—including Moscow and
St. Petersburg.
Earlier, Putin had responded to this unrest by
adopting a modest form of nation building—but the
funds earmarked for that endeavor in Chechnya,
Dagestan, Ingushetia, and other entities in the region
did not help the people who needed assistance. As
Navalny had claimed, much of the money was stolen
by local mobsters and their Russian confederates.
The violent upheaval in southern Russia, however,
gave rise to a new development: the creation of Slavicnationalist “fighting groups.” The expanding Islamic
jihad facilitated the resurrection of Cossacks in areas
near the Volga and other places where Russians and
Muslims lived in close proximity to one another. But
now paramilitary organizations, with help from local
police and military units, were flourishing and uniting
around an anti-Islamic agenda. Intercommunal enmity had been fed by the Kremlin’s campaign to fold
ethnic political entities into larger ones to minimize
the influence of non-Russian groups. But it backfired
and gave ethnic separatists ammunition to take on
Russian chauvinism. Along a parallel path, the Kremlin bankrolled indigenous leaders—most notably the
Chechen Ramzan Kadyrov—to enlist their support
in the struggle against the jihadists. They did so with
relentless brutality and in fact served as a recruiting
tool for the jihadists and other insurgents operating in
minority communities in many parts of Russia.
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This scenario had its origins in the split that first attracted international attention in the fall of 2011 when
Putin took back the presidency and left Medvedev
twisting in the wind. A year later, after the younger
man was pilloried in anonymous videos—among
other things for supporting the UN resolution that
condoned the Libyan bombing campaign conducted
by NATO—pundits reported the end of the “tandem.”
Kremlin insiders claimed Putin was convinced that
Medvedev had betrayed him by collaborating with
the very Technocrats and middle class liberals that
were subverting the Power Vertical.25
At the same time, Putin claimed the Technocrats
were collaborating with foreign (read American)
agents who were seeking to subvert Russia. This was
an attempt to reclaim the support of those provincials
that had expressed doubt about Putin’s capacity to
rule in their behalf. His penchant for scapegoating
was not new; he did the same thing after the Beslan
School massacre in North Ossetia when he linked the
Chechen insurgents—responsible for the outrage—to
unnamed foreign enemies. They were not only bent
on undermining Putin but destroying “Russia itself.”26
Here, then, was an attempt on Putin’s part to
purge from his team anyone who did not demonstrate
unqualified loyalty to him, while at the same time
striving to regain the trust of those ordinary folk that
remained tethered to Soviet-style enterprises or who
lived by sufferance of State entitlements. He hoped to
achieve this two-part objective by creating a new popular front movement that replaced what remained of
the Power Vertical with a new regime that enhanced
his capacity to rule. Toward this end, he promoted an
ultra-nationalist Slavic narrative that celebrated Russia’s magnificent past exploits. The campaign began
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on December 12, 2012, when he delivered a state of
the nation address at the resplendent St. George Hall
in the Grand Kremlin Palace. “Putin barely mentioned
the outside world,” but said that Russians needed “to
turn inward” and:
look to patriotism, not Westernism; to solidarity, not
individualism; to spirituality, not consumerism and
moral decay. He touted Russia’s historic roots and traditional values as the basis for its future trajectory.27

Democracy was the only political choice for Russia,
but it rested on “the power of the Russian people with
their own traditions of self-rule and not the fulfillment
of standards imposed on us from the outside.”28 To
protect his political flank, he was banking on deeply
rooted cultural values, historical experiences, and religious impulses associated with Slavic ultra-nationalism, the Orthodox Church, and centuries of imperial
rule that elevated all ethnic Russians. He reasoned the
Russian people would embrace the existential imperatives of community, not the abstractions of reason that
enthralled the urban liberals. Earlier, Putin neither
encouraged the nationalists nor vilified the country’s
large Muslim population, but in one of his first public
events at the Presidential Palace in 2012, he appeared
in a photo-op with a Russian heavy metal motorcycle
gang that celebrated the Russian Orthodox faith. In
their lyrics, they attacked Muslims in the most brutal terms imaginable.29 Moreover, while the Moscow
intelligentsia excoriated him for endorsing the Pussy
Riot rock group’s 2-year jail sentence, polls indicated
that most Russians favored it. From the perspective
of the ultra-nationalists with whom the Siloviki had
found common cause, the only problem was that Putin did not go far enough in “putting the minorities in
their place.”
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But they also cited Putin’s temerity in not crushing
the Russian regional elites that had established virtual
independent fiefdoms from Vladivostok in the Far
East to Kaliningrad in the Far West. In Siberia, political leaders in conjunction with local business interests
were snubbing federal authorities, and some members
of the regional police and military units were actively
collaborating with them. Simultaneously, Omon-type
units were being deployed in border regions where
the population was vulnerable to foreign influences.
In this connection, Kaliningrad, the Western most
oblast that is surrounded by Lithuania and Poland,
was considered by security operatives uniquely sensitive to “outside provocation.”30
Finally, the government turned to the cosmopolitans and their most powerful weapon, the Internet. In
conjunction with “smart phones,” it was an unrivalled
recruiting tool that enabled them to disseminate their
“subversive” pro-Western narrative throughout Russia. As a consequence, a nationwide campaign to
“purge” the Internet was undertaken: it involved censorship, the closing of portals, and the arrest of bloggers. The number accused of political crimes tripled
from 2011 to 2012. The campaign silenced many of
them, while others fled the country or disconnected
their computers.31 The newest campaign would take
even more draconian measures to emasculate the
Internet and associated technology such as “smart
phones.”
Even so, tens of thousands of Russians that lived
in the diaspora—in tech savvy localities like Silicon
Valley, California, and Fairfax, Virginia, as well as
throughout Europe—conducted a “truth telling” campaign to counteract the Kremlin’s disinformation blitz.
Their ability to communicate in Russian was of special
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concern to the Siloviki because most ordinary folk in
Russia were not fluent in English. It was with similar
concerns in mind that the authorities turned toward
foreign affairs with even greater zeal than did Putin.
It was a blogger in Spain—Dr. Z—who revealed that
Vladimir Pekhtin, a Duma representative, had property in Miami, Florida, that eventually led to his ouster
from that body.32 In turn, his fate gave impetus to Putin’s decision to order government officials to return
all of their foreign assets to Russia. In doing so, Putin
could anticipate alienating many of the same people
who had been his most steadfast supporters.
The International Prospect.
Under these circumstances, prospects for a re-balance in U.S.-Russia relations were hobbled. While realists urged President Obama to cooperate with Russia on matters of mutual concern—fighting terrorism,
curbing the proliferation of WMD, etc.—anti-Russian
sentiment soared among members of Congress and
human rights activists. White House political advisers
and policymakers were at odds over this matter, since
the former argued that the domestic political costs of
any effort to cooperate with Moscow exceeded the anticipated international benefits.
What had been called a “crackdown on steroids”
produced much the same reaction in European capitals. Berlin and Moscow had enjoyed a “special relationship” for years so that members of Germany’s
Social Democratic Party and Christian Democratic
Party alike had kept silent in face of the most odious
behavior emanating from Russia. This largely reflected the power of the German business community that
relied upon Russia for energy and in return saw it as
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a customer hungry for German products. But ever
since Chancellor Angela Merkel scolded Putin for his
human rights violations in late-2012, the relationship
cooled considerably. The rest of Europe pretty much
reacted the same way to developments in Russia. As
the Europeans depended less upon Russia’s energy,
animosity toward the Kremlin prompted some seasoned observers to proclaim a new cold war was in
the works.33
Moscow’s aggressive behavior toward the countries occupying the former Soviet space was another
source of concern in the West. Efforts to reintegrate—or
what former Secretary Clinton called “re-Sovietize”—
Belarus and Ukraine were dramatically accelerated
by Moscow. Minsk and Kiev, wracked by economic
problems and political turmoil, could not refuse Russian orders to snub the West. They needed the Russians more than the other way around, and here was
evidence of the Putin Doctrine at work. In addition
to maintaining its superpower nuclear status, Russia
sought “regional hegemony” that involved “political,
economic, military, and cultural reintegration of the
former Soviet bloc.” An important element here was
the campaign to enforce “Finlandization” upon the
countries formerly tied to the USSR.34 They could conduct their domestic affairs any way they wished, but
their foreign relations had to conform to the dictates of
the Russian foreign ministry.
Russian-Georgian relations took a turn for the
worse, and some observers talked openly about a replay of the Five-Day War. Russian officials claimed
that Georgians once closely aligned with Saakashvili were now actively supporting jihadists in Russia.
His replacement, Bidzina Ivanishvili, tried to placate
the Russians, but his courting NATO membership
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was cited by officials in Moscow as evidence of his
“double-dealing.”
Even though Ukrainian government favored close
relations with Moscow and its leadership and people
alike rejected NATO membership, the Kremlin was
not happy about Kiev’s bid for EU membership. As
a consequence of the Siloviki victory, the Kremlin demanded Kiev not deviate from the policies that were
favored in Moscow.
Officials in Baku likewise claimed that Russian provocateurs were encouraging the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh to provoke new violent confrontations
with the pro-American Azeri government. Since Russia supported the Armenians and Turkey supported
the Azeris, this frozen conflict threatened to do serious harm to relations between Moscow and Istanbul.
At the same time, there were many influential voices
in Moscow that saw closer relations with Tehran as
a counterpoint to the American-Turkish campaign to
compromise Russia’s interests in its “own back yard.”
Imperialistic utterances from Moscow prompted
expressions of alarm throughout the “near abroad.”
Kremlin security agents became bolder in fomenting political discord in all of them, while Moscow
exploited its economic assets to subvert members of
the local business community and media.35 After all,
the Siloviki claimed the Lithuanians were conducting
workshops to help provocateurs undermine Russia’s
government. Along with Poland, it was a base for Belorussians who were plotting regime change in their
old homeland. In response, Lithuanian authorities
lobbied Brussels and Washington to reaffirm NATO’s
Article Five obligations and bolster defenses throughout Eastern Europe.
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In this frigid environment, the perceived linkage between Russia’s internal problems and the U.S.
campaign to promote regime change encouraged the
Kremlin to obstruct American foreign policy priorities—like those favoring radical change in the Greater
Middle East. Therefore Moscow demonstrated special
sensitivity when the Americans sought international
justification to intimidate the Mullahs in Tehran. The
military cited America’s “aggressive and subversive”
foreign initiatives to justify a dramatic hike in defense spending. Their civilian masters needed no encouragement when the campaign to sustain Russia’s
nuclear strike force was mentioned. Money was tight,
but Russia’s very survival depended upon its nuclear
deterrent. Likewise, it was unconscionable to deny
funding for general purpose forces. The army, air, and
naval arms all had to be upgraded to the point where
foreign enemies could not assume a military strike
against Russia would go unpunished.
Thinking along these lines was an asset to those
hawks in the Kremlin who looked upon heavy defense spending as an economic force multiplier. In a
word, the road to a growing diversified economy. Of
course, this bogus notion was popular among the Soviet Nomenklatura, and the technocrats warned that it
would do grave harm to Russia’s economy in the 21st
century the same way it did to the Soviet economy in
the 20th century. Earlier, Putin had been warned that
his rearmament drive that amounted to “$700 billion
over a decade without first developing a security and
defense strategy that” was “aligned with 21st-century
realities” was a major blunder.36 At the same time, the
army’s drive for heavy defense spending rested on
the principle of deterrence, not domination. In event
of another Georgian war, the West—including the
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Americans—would have to think twice about providing reckless provocateurs like Saakashvili with weapons. Russia did not welcome a military confrontation
with NATO, but it wanted to make any aggressor pay
a price so heavy that it would avoid a confrontation
with Russian forces in the first place—not to defeat
them in a conventional war.
Of course, intemperate accusations from Russian
officials prompted expressions of outrage in Washington and gave rise to demands in Congress for the
United States to re-deploy U.S. air, ground, and naval
units in Eastern Europe. Many in the American media
and think tanks openly proclaimed the onset of a “new
cold war.” Whatever measures the White House took,
any hope of cooperating with Russia on security matters were dashed. EU officials and their counterparts
in Europe’s major capitals likewise expressed alarm
about Russia’s quick-march back toward Stalinist-like
policies.
The crackdown and scapegoating, however, only
contributed to Russia’s dysfunctional image, resulting
in a massive pullback in capital on the part of both
domestic and international investors. Predictably, this
reaction plunged the economy into a deeper morass.
To compensate, revenues originally earmarked for social welfare programs were redirected toward a burgeoning defense budget.
As fears about a serious insurgency soared, the
Kremlin leadership became even more sensitive to
“efforts on the part of foreign enemies” to exploit the
situation. Officials in various government think-tanks
produced papers providing “evidence” that U.S.
“black services” were supporting the jihadists just as
they did in subverting Assad in Syria and Mubarak in
Egypt. Under these circumstances, it was ludicrous to
prattle about a rebalance of U.S.-Russian relations.
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Nonetheless, the overlords in the Kremlin were
acute enough to realize that the correlation of forces
favored the West and not the hobbled resurrected Russian state in any military showdown. Tough rhetoric
aside, they neither had the means nor the will to act
upon their threats to engage their neighbors in violent
confrontations. That said, many analysts feared that
the hawks in Moscow might mistakenly believe that
they knew where the red lines were—lines that they
would never cross lest they provoke a violent clash
with their neighbors and their Western protectors.
There was also a contentious debate raging in Russia’s defense establishment about joining the PLA in
a truly effective security relationship. Some argued
against this option since it would mean Russia would
serve as the junior partner. But others noted that Russia’s nuclear strike force would make it at the very least
an equal partner in the enterprise. This was especially
the case when the generals in the PLA considered
that serious discussions were taking place in defense
circles in Seoul, South Korea, and Tokyo, Japan, about
South Korea and Japan building their own nuclear
arsenals since they could no longer depend upon the
American deterrent. With Russia’s nuclear arsenal as
a force multiplier, the PLA would have a formidable
counterweight in Beijing’s protracted competition
with the Americans.
Whatever the prospects for a Chinese-Russian security arrangement, proponents of a re-balance in relations with Russia had to answer a compelling question: How could any American administration find
avenues of security cooperation with Moscow in this
toxic environment?
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RUSSIA IN CHAOS: THE WORST
CASE SCENARIO
The Domestic Prospect.
Kremlin-watchers agree that the days of the Power
Vertical and Putin’s rule are numbered, and Russian
society is about to face significant internal political
disruptions.37 The people running things in Russia,
however, appear to be ill-prepared to deal with them.
Likewise, the last time Russia faced a “formidable
challenge to its great power ambitions” was about 3
centuries ago. In the end, Russia survived this “time of
troubles” and actually expanded its empire. But this
time, Russian-watchers predict the Kremlin leadership will prove incapable of imposing its will upon
Russia’s foreign rivals and, worse yet, may face a new
internal crisis that results in a fate similar to that of
the USSR.
In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s breakup,
many leaders, Putin among them, feared Russia might
go the way of Yugoslavia and fragment into a number of parts. But today, few foreign analysts believe
Russia will break apart or experience widespread violence bordering on civil war. Many deem talk of this
nature as simply foolhardy. Leonid Radzikhovsky is
one of them; he dismisses predictions of Russia’s disintegration implausible since most of its residents are
ethnic Russians who represent about 70 percent of the
population, and they recoil at the idea that Russia will
be the subject of Balkanization à la Yugoslavia. Most
minority ethnic groups or political enterprises like Tatarstan cannot function as viable economic and political entities without Russian help. Those that reside on
borders with foreign countries such as China cannot
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rely upon Beijing’s help in breaking free of Russian
rule. On the contrary, like their rival in Washington,
the leadership in Beijing has little stomach for Russia’s
fragmentation. It would have exceedingly ominous
consequence for the United States and China alike as
the shock waves it promulgated would destabilize a
world already in a state of disorder and existential
peril. Also, any attempt to openly encourage Russians
to turn against their own leaders would be foolhardy,
given Russia’s massive WMD arsenal.38
American analysts who deem serious internal strife
and political chaos in Russia implausible, however,
must consider all possible outcomes, especially those
that have the potential of profoundly changing the international security picture. Currently, analysts worry
about jihadists securing WMD in Syria and Pakistan
that could be used against neighboring countries or
even the United States. But neither possesses the vast
arsenal of biological weapons, chemical agents, and
nuclear weapons, along with sophisticated delivery
systems, that Russia does. Fears about Russia cascading into chaos then justify serious study, even if most
analysts believe it implausible. Recall how few members of the American security community believed an
attack akin to September 11, 2001 (9/11) was plausible? Also remember that the vast majority of American security analysts failed to anticipate the breakup
of the Soviet Empire.
Soon after Gorbachev became General Secretary of
the CPSU in 1985, national security experts in Washington rallied around four perspectives:
1. The Soviet Leviathan. With the publication of
George F. Kennan’s historic Sources of Soviet Conduct
in 1947, the major concern of U.S. strategists rested
on the fear that the Warsaw Pact would overrun the
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NATO defenders—even if they did not resort to tactical nuclear weapons as was their intention. Subsequently, realists argued that what happened within
the USSR was of little consequence, what mattered
most was its capacity to project its power internationally. Moreover, even conceding it confronted serious
economic, ethnic, and political problems, the notion
that the Soviet Empire would be brought down as a
result of “internal contradictions” was unthinkable.
The analysts who eventually became known as the
neo-conservatives, and deemed Richard Nixon’s policy of détente disastrous, were of the same opinion.
The Kremlin overlords enjoyed a monopoly of power—the Red Army, KGB, and militia—so they would
have little difficulty crushing the dissidents.
In failing to anticipate the Soviet Union’s collapse, both camps committed a monumental intellectual error. They were not alone; prominent American
statesmen like Henry Kissinger deemed the USSR’s
disintegration a fantasy and only a minority of his
colleagues—most notably Zbigniew Brzezinski—believed otherwise. Jimmy Carter’s former national
security chief was among the minority that correctly
predicted that the “nationalities question” was the
USSR’s Achilles heel. Gorbachev forgot that and lost
an empire.39
2. Hardliners Would Replace Gorbachev. By 1991, as
Perestroika exacerbated the very problems it was designed to resolve, the George H. W. Bush administration feared Gorbachev would be replaced by hardliners who favored a reaffirmation of Stalinist policies and
not liberal reforms. In an attempt to save Gorbachev—
and, in effect, the Soviet Empire—President George
H. W. Bush flew to Kiev where he pleaded with the
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Ukrainians not to leave “Gorbie” in a lurch and join a
new truncated union that was under discussion. This
desertion of what Ronald Reagan had championed
under the rubric “rollback” prompted William Safire
of The New York Times to characterize Bush’s words
as the “Chicken-Kiev” speech.40 Bush was credited for
not humiliating Gorbachev’s successors but had he
anticipated the USSR’s collapse, perhaps Washington would have been better prepared to deal with the
aftermath of this staggering historical event—specifically, taking steps to eventually integrate Russia into a
post-Cold War European security system.
3. An Impotent Russia Tethered To The West. A more
benign view of post-Soviet Russia prevailed in Washington after the collapse of Soviet imperialism in Eastern Europe, the free-fall in the Red Army’s capabilities,
the subsequent dramatic decline in population and
territory and profound economic difficulties that culminated in the 1998 crash.41 In a word, Russia was no
longer an existential threat even though it possessed
a massive nuclear arsenal. Programs like the NunnLugar initiative helped ameliorate the misuse of the
Soviet nuclear arsenal and, more recently, so did the
New Start Treaty. Furthermore, Russia’s leaders were
preoccupied with the daunting task of rebuilding a
country riven by a host of serious internal challenges.
After cooperating with Russia in some areas, the
George H. Bush administration alarmed the Kremlin
by scrapping the ABM Treaty—and, following Bill
Clinton’s example, expanded NATO eastward; subsequently, relations between both countries cooled. In
2009, Obama forged a reset in relations that resulted in
the New Start Treaty and expansion of the Northern
Distribution Network that was vital to the American
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military campaign in Afghanistan, but by 2012, the
reset was deemed moribund. Indeed, a year earlier,
Russia was only mentioned briefly in the Joint Chiefs
National Military Strategy document.
We seek to co-operate with Russia on counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, space, and ballistic missile
defense, and welcome it playing a more active role in
preserving security and stability in Asia.42

Russian commentators complained that Russia
was mentioned as a sub-text to the principle American
preoccupation—Asia.
During his first term as president and in spite of
his tough rhetoric, Putin believed Russia’s fate rested
upon a harmonious relationship with the Americans.
By 2007, Putin changed his tune when he proclaimed
at Munich that the “unipolar moment”—i.e., when the
Americans dictated to the world—was over. Henceforth, Russia had to be treated like an equal, not a
supplicant, but he reasoned the prospects for fruitful cooperation were slim, so he passed the Western
portfolio over to his young sidekick, Medvedev. In
focusing on Putin’s remarks, however, many observers overlook two pertinent observations: first, in that
same address, Putin indicated that he wanted to work
with Bush in stemming the proliferation of nuclear
weapons; and second, in Russia’s 2012 foreign policy
concept a working relationship with the West is acknowledged as a priority.43
4. The Breakup of the Soviet Empire and Armageddon.
In 1993, as the last Russian trucks rumbled through
the streets of old town Vilnius, Lithuania, one displayed a sign with four ominous words: “WE WILL
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BE BACK!” This prospect was not ignored by Lithuania’s leaders who feared that in the near future a
return of Russian tanks was a real prospect. Many
of their neighbors harbored the same nightmare, but
some observers deemed this scenario less likely than
a more existential threat. Russia would implode much
as the Soviet Empire did, only this time with violent
outbreaks throughout the country, and the subsequent
turbulence would spread to the Baltic democracies
since many revanchists in Moscow claimed all three
were part of Russia’s patrimony.
This fourth perspective represented a minority
view and did not receive the attention that it deserved.
Yet there were a number of reasons why Russia could
follow the Soviet example:
•	The daunting challenge of succession was unresolved;
•	The centrifugal forces of ethnic separatism was
a real prospect as the insurgencies in the North
Caucasus flourished and the Muslims that represented almost 20 percent of the population
became disgruntled with Russian rule;
•	The military was demoralized and in disarray
as enlisted men and many officers and their
families lived in squalor;
•	The criminal organizations that thrived under
the USSR now openly operated in collusion
with the Siloviki and the oligarchs; and,
•	The vast majority of ordinary people were as
powerless as they were during Soviet rule.
And, of course, the man who was president, Boris
Yeltsin, was an aging drunk with chronic heart disease who was incapable of managing the economy.
Under these circumstances, there was a real prospect
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that Russia would implode, and it almost did on several occasions.
In October 1993, after President Yeltsin disbanded
the Parliament, Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi led
the fight against this “abuse of power.” He had the
support of communists and nationalists, but the Army
surrounded the White House with tanks and fired
upon the rebels, forcing them to surrender. The tank
commanders decided to do so after several days of
hesitation and only after Yeltsin mobilized the citizens
of Moscow in opposing Rutskoi and his supporters.
Given the president’s grassroots support, any units
that were prepared to side with the Vice-President ran
the risk of a violent outbreak that could consume the
entire country. According to official reports, 146 people were killed and 1,000 wounded during the conflict. But the bloodletting could have been far worse
and the outcome truly disastrous.
Later, Yeltsin’s selection of the Siloviki’s favorite
for Prime Minister—Vladimir Putin—was a result of
a silent coup. Had Yeltsin refused to bend to pressure
from the military and security services, no one knows
what the outcome would have been but something
akin to a military putsch could not be discounted.
Fast forward to the present and as a consequence of
events and policies that were highlighted in the Stalin
Lite scenario, Russia lapses into chaos. The major catalyst is an economic downturn as hydrocarbon rents
nosedive and other sectors of the economy stagnate
while domestic and foreign investors flee the country.
Henceforth, the Kremlin cannot provide workers “living wages,” while those in the old Soviet-style industries face the blight of unemployment. The plight of
pensioners, and those individuals who rely upon government entitlements, result in unprecedented eco-
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nomic hardship and spawn massive protests among
the provincials.
The picture becomes even darker when the Kremlin is informed that the “demographic time bomb”
that demographers earlier had speculated about had
become a reality. Russian women were having babies
in ever smaller numbers, while the working-age population was shrinking. The estimate that Russia would
lose 26 million productive citizens by 2050 appeared
to be on target.
Meanwhile, the flow of funds to the military and
security services had become problematic, and orders
for new weapons and equipment were cancelled. As
the supply of 18-year-old recruits slumped, it became ever more difficult to recruit capable soldiers.
Under these circumstances, some members of the officer corps seek salvation in alliances with economic
warlords, criminal gangs, and ultra-nationalist organizations that have mushroomed in the face of economic hardship, social upheaval, and a dysfunctional
political system.
At the same time, the Kremlin leadership is incapable of dealing with events since the clans are at
war with one another, and at times the conflict has
resulted in violent clashes between them. Without Putin, the oligarchs and other powerful players in Russian society no longer have a referee to establish and
enforce rules that rationalize business deals—with
the predictable outcome being chaos. Moreover, the
perpetual struggle between the elites in the center and
those in the provinces has taken on a new intensity as
regional business and political leaders in the hinterland now operate like independent entities. The flow
of commodities and resources from the provinces no
longer can be taken for granted by the overlords in
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Moscow. It was with this fear in mind that in 2004 Putin adopted policies that denied local constituents the
opportunity to choose their governors.
To make matters worse, there is an uptick in the
quantity and quality of armed insurgencies being
waged within Russia. They are not only limited to the
North Caucasus where religious fanaticism has replaced nationalistic impulses as the motivating force
for violence. Armed groups that appear in minority
communities have facilitated the formation of Cossack
fighting units and like-minded ultra-Slavic nationalist
entities that are supported by nervous members of the
Kremlin elite.
As these developments unfold, the White House
national security team calls a special session after receiving the following terse message from the American
Ambassador in Moscow: “The ruling elite are badly
divided. Expect Armageddon!” In return, he receives
the following response from the White House: “Who
is in charge?” and “Are the WMD safe?”
One observation that has a bearing on both questions is that while the people in charge under Stalin
Lite embarked upon aggressive rhetoric and at times
took measures that made their neighbors nervous,
they judiciously honored Red Lines. They were not
foolish enough to engage in confrontations that would
lead to a military showdown with NATO.
But the motley collection of warlords, ethnic insurgent leaders, mafia crime bosses, and those heading
regional fiefdoms often ignored Red Lines or proved
incapable of controlling their fractious followers.
Even more alarming, since the military’s command
structure collapsed, American intelligence doubted
the authorities could deny insurgents access to the
vast inventory of nuclear weapons, tactical as well
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as strategic ones—along with delivery systems—not
to mention the lethal arsenal of biological agents and
chemical weapons that Russia possesses. Even if the
WMD were safe, the availability of a vast storehouse
of conventional arms would provide undisciplined
armed factions with the firepower to wage civil war.
The International Prospect.
The Eurasian Economic Union’s disintegration was
a cruel blow for the Kremlin. It was designed to snatch
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, and Ukraine
from the clutches of the EU’s Eastern Partnership program by offering alternative trade and commercial opportunities that Brussels dangled before them. Putin
first embarked upon the venture with his sights set on
Belarus and Kazakhstan since both depended upon
Russia’s energy and pipelines and sought access to a
market of 143 million people. But not far into his term,
Putin used his formidable economic clout to force
Ukraine and Moldova into the Union. It provided the
Kremlin with a geo-political architecture consistent
with Russia’s campaign to project its power throughout most of the former Soviet space—priority number
one of the 2012 foreign policy concept.
According to American analysts, a week after Putin proclaimed that he would run for the presidency
in 2012, he:
. . . announced his desire for Russia to again lead a
multinational bloc of tightly bound, former Soviet
Republics. But major obstacles stand in the way of
Putin’s project, and the prospects of a new Eurasian
Union emerging any time soon in the former Soviet
space are small.44

62

Given mounting economic problems within all of
the member states and pandemic corruption, lawlessness and Russia’s contempt for the junior partners, the
Union unraveled. It represented a major economic setback for the Siloviki and their business associates and
precipitated a bitter and at times violent struggle to
secure control of a shrinking pie. It also undermined
the Kremlin’s campaign to thrust Russia before the
world again as a major international force.
In the Ukraine, a country the size of France with a
population of 46 million, the leadership was divided,
and turbulence originating in Russia ignited a violent
confrontation between its warring factions. At the
same time, there were clashes between well-armed
ethnic Russians and Ukrainian nationalists in many
places, and in the Crimea what remained of the Tatar
population attacked Russian naval units. At the same
time, criminal clans representing disparate ethnic
communities were involved in violent confrontations
that fed the flames of discord throughout the country.
In the case of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenka resorted to even more violent means to crush democratic activists and to intimidate ordinary citizens. In contrast to the past, this campaign of brutal suppression
prompted a backlash, and the violence threatened to
spill over into Lithuania and Poland.
In Russia’s Far East, foreign revanchists were encouraging Russian and minority elites to break with
Moscow and enjoy de facto, if not de jure, independence. In short, predictions that Russia would someday lose control of territory “East of the Urals” were
no longer delusional.
A Russia on the verge of collapse prompted some
in Beijing to consider how China might exploit its
neighbor’s time of troubles. Some intelligence ana-
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lysts in the West concluded that, while China coveted
this prized territory, the PLA was not unmindful of
Yeltsin’s remark that, while Russia’s “nuclear-tipped
rockets were rusty, they worked.” While the Russians
were preoccupied with their own internal problems,
the Chinese set their sights on Central Asia where
they helped puppets of Beijing crush their political
opponents. That was no easy task since jihadists in
all five countries, encouraged by Russia’s preoccupation with its own internal challenges, were conducting
insurgencies with the expectation of victory and the
creation of a single Central Asian Caliphate.
To complicate the security picture, sectarian violence erupted in many cities which attracted non-Russian migrants from many parts of the former Soviet
Union. In Moscow, ethnic Russians clashed with Muslim migrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Consequently, jihadist leaders concluded that the time
was ripe to create an Islamist Caliphate within Russia’s borders; that is, one that far exceeded in ambition
like-minded efforts that already operated there.
In addition to providing arms, ammunition, and
money to indigenous jihadists, fighters from throughout the Greater Middle East were now infiltrating into
Russia in significant numbers. At the same time, they
were responsible for a frenzy of bombings and assassinations in major Russian cities and destroyed vital
economic targets like pipelines, pumping stations, rail
tracks, and power networks.
The Russian military—whose ranks were filled
with disgruntled enlisted and officer personnel—were
incapable of stabilizing the situation. They lacked sufficient communications equipment, vehicles, appropriate aircraft, and weapon systems to suppress the
insurgents. In a growing number of instances, the in-
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surgents employed tactics that bled American forces
in Iraq and Afghanistan and, when necessary, found
safe havens in neighboring Islamic countries. It was
obvious that they hoped to provoke violent confrontations between Russian and Western units in areas of
the former Soviet space just as their compatriots had
successfully done in setting off Sunnis and Shiites in
the Greater Middle East.
In conclusion, a Russia stricken by the collapse of
central authority, resulting in de facto, if not de jure,
fragmentation of the regime along with other dislocations may constitute the least plausible scenario
but should it materialize, the consequences for the
international order will be monumental. Stricken by
a power vacuum, something approaching anarchism
cannot be discounted along with the proliferation of
ethnic, religious, regional, and economic fiefdoms that
replace centralized authority in Russia. The new lines
of authority, then, are horizontal, not vertical. This is
one of the major features of the turmoil that has appeared throughout the greater Middle East, and much
the same thing could happen in Russia. For this reason
alone, U.S. planners must pay serious attention to it.
Since this scenario is deemed unthinkable, a number
of controversial questions regarding Russian relations
have not been part of public discourse, but they deserve our attention:
•	Were this scenario to materialize, how would
the United States and its NATO allies respond
to this colossal event? In considering intervention, we might consider the mistakes that we
made in the Greater Middle East: namely, the
jihadist threat was only a part of a far larger
historical development—a civil war within Islam that could only be resolved by the 1.3 bil-
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lion members of the Islamic Umma, not by outsiders. The lesson: let the Russians resolve their
own crises.45
•	Arguably, the most compelling rational for intervention is prompted by the question:
• Could the United States stand by and allow jihadist fanatics, irrational ultra-nationalists, and
undisciplined nonstate actors secure control of
Russia’s massive nuclear arsenal and associated
chemical and biological weapons—not to mention its vast arsenal of conventional weapons?
•	How would the West respond to requests from
Russian authorities that they required outside
help to prevent their WMD from falling into
the “wrong hands?” Would it choose sides in
the hope of producing an outcome favorable to
the victory of pluralist interests or would it—
fearing a disastrous entanglement—remain as
an interested but hesitant bystander?
•	How would the United States respond to intrusions on the part of foreign agents or countries
seeking to seize control of Russia’s WMD or
parts of its territory? Would it respond unilaterally or through NATO or the UN? Is it plausible to include China in such an enterprise and
if not, what role might Beijing play in this unthinkable event?
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Final Word on Putin and the Power Vertical.
Some analysts would argue that Russia has left behind the Status Quo scenario, and that Putin’s crackdown justifies the claim that the Stalin Lite alternative better represents conditions in Russia today. The
evidence is mounting that there are bad days ahead
for Russia’s one-legged economy as profits for gas
and oil along with commodity prices are problematic.
Without a steady supply of revenues, Putin can neither meet the promises he has made to workers and
pensioners nor to members of the military industrial
complex. Efforts to diversify the economy have produced limited results, and Putin has no plans in place
to address the myriad roadblocks to a law-based free
market economy. Prospects for economic growth will
slip even further as both domestic and foreign investors, hounded by corruption and lawlessness, withdraw money from Russia.
Putin is attempting to reconfigure his political
base by turning to the church, Slavic nationalism, and
a celebration of Mother Russia, but most analysts believe that ultimately he will fail to stabilize a society in
turmoil. He may adopt even harsher repressive measures to silence the democrats, purge his inner circle,
and craft a new political order. But as the Siloviki and
clans lose confidence in him, he will be neutralized or
removed from power.
That said, Putin’s demise may be years in the future. While the Power Vertical can survive without
him, the Siloviki surge further toward the autocratic
right, banking the regime’s survival upon Russian
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nationalism, the church, and a successful campaign
to portray the cosmopolitans as agents of the United
States and carriers of alien values. A climate of fear
among them, and pervasive apathy among the provincials, will allow the hardliners to survive for
some time.
Russian-watchers mention a number of people
who are likely successors of Putin: Deputy Prime
Minister Dmitry Rogozin; Sergei Ivanov, the Kremlin
Chief of Staff; Sergey Shoigu, the Defense Minister;
and Igor Sechin, the head of Rosneft. It is noteworthy
that Sechin has been called the “second most powerful man in Russia.” He has worked closely with his
“boss” ever since the St. Petersburg days and now is
the chief executive officer for the oil giant, Rosneft. After Khorokovsky was sent to prison, Yukos was folded into Rosneft and as a consequence of buying out
British Petroleum’s oil investments, the firm became
the largest oil company in Russia. At 50, Sechin, who
served as a KGB operative in Africa, is seen as a man
on the move; a crafty operator that popularized the
notion that Russia would not take the Western road to
development but rather one consistent with its unique
history, culture, and immense size. Most recently,
Mayor Sergei Sobyanin has been touted as a likely future president, many Russians noting that Yeltsin took
that road to power decades ago.
Whoever replaces Putin, his successor is likely to
falter for much the same reason that Gorbachev did
a generation ago if the successor attempts to manage
the emerging crisis within the prevailing political and
economic order and not acknowledge that it has to be
scrapped in favor of pluralistic economic and political
institutions that are in keeping with the 21st century.
The best and brightest in Russia favor a Western road
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to development, and, while they may be neutralized
at present, ultimately they will be successful in moving Russia toward the European norm of governance.
The campaign to stabilize Russia through a police
state will ultimately fail as it fosters a split among the
power elite, the resurrection of the democratic movement, and massive expressions of disgruntlement on
the part of ordinary Russians. But here is a pathway to
either the “best” or the “worst” case scenarios. In the
first case, the reactionaries are swept from power and
Russia takes The Western Path to Development.
Of course, the Siloviki’s failure to stabilize the
country may precipitate a second outcome where the
center does not hold and Russia is consumed with violent outbreaks and balkanization as disparate regional
elites create de facto sovereign fiefdoms—in a word, it
is stricken by all infirmities associated with the Russia
in Chaos scenario.
As the U.S. Government considers the plausibility of a rebalance in relations with Russia, it behooves
American strategists to pay serious attention to all of
these outcomes. In particular, they cannot discount a
replay of the events that led to the breakup of the Soviet Empire in 1991, only this time with an even more
daunting outcome. This is not the most likely scenario,
but it is certainly the most perilous one.
Russia Must Remain a Central Preoccupation
of U.S. Foreign Policy.
Russia remains vital to U.S. national security for a
variety of reasons:
•	It alone has the capacity to destroy the United
States in a nuclear war; it has 1,499 deployed
warheads and 491 deployed delivery systems.
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By contrast, China only has 50 intercontinental ballistic missiles that can reach the United
States.46 Russia’s nuclear arsenal—tactical and
strategic—and a massive inventory of chemical
agents and biologic weapons constitute a prize
for rogue states and terrorists of all stripes.
•	Russia occupies the largest land mass of any
state. Within and adjacent to its borders, where
more than half of the world’s population resides, there lies a vast supply of the earth’s
resources, including large amounts of hydrocarbon and a system of pipelines that deliver
them to consumers in Europe and Asia. It has
an enormous amount of minerals, critical metals, and fresh water, not to mention access to
the Arctic’s treasure trove of natural resources.
•	Russia has made an impressive contribution to
world culture, and today it is home for millions
of highly educated and technologically gifted
citizens. Their enterprise and talent will eventually set Russia on a firm path to modernization
and enable it once again to become a significant
force in world affairs.
•	Russia has a UN veto, and, through a host of
other international organizations and international experts, it has the means to influence
events worldwide. It has been active in projecting its power in the former Soviet space, and
this is the basis for Secretary Clinton’s claim
that Putin wants to “re-Sovietize the region”
through “the guise of regional cooperation.”47 A
democratic, prosperous and stable Russia will
have a positive impact upon all of the countries
that once were associated with the USSR.
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•	Arguably, the prospect of stabilizing Eurasia
and much of the Greater Middle East without
Russia’s cooperation is well-nigh impossible.
•	Russia is an Asian power, and American analysts cannot ignore it in the Asian Pivot. Were
it to join China in a military alliance, the consequence for U.S. security would be immense.
Conversely, harmonious Chinese-Russian-U.S.
relations would enhance the international community’s capacity to exploit untapped resources and promote the peace in the Far East.
The Long-Term Goal of a Re-Balance In Relations:
Russia’s Integration into the Euro-Atlantic
Community.
After the Soviet Union imploded, the West’s biggest mistake was not integrating Russia into a range
of Euro-Atlantic institutions. After the Warsaw Treaty
Organization had vanished, NATO’s number one priority was to offer membership to former Soviet Satellites and Republics that wanted to join the alliance.
At this juncture, the prospect of including Russia in
this historical campaign was simply too daunting to
contemplate.
Russian analysts claimed Yeltsin’s biggest mistake
was to ape the West and not to follow a path consistent with Russian history and culture. In response,
Stephen Kotkin has observed they, “. . . seem not to
have noticed that, for the most part, Russia did just
that.” In absence of modern democratic political institutions, such as “a strong judiciary to enforce the rule
of law, property rights and the accountability of officials,” Russia’s plight was largely of its own making.48
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In 1997, the NATO-Russian Joint Council was created to provide Russia with a voice in Euro-Atlantic
security affairs, and similar measures followed without any substantive outcome.49 After Bush scrapped
the Cold War era ABM Treaty, Putin concluded that
the window of cooperation was closing quickly, although he allowed Medvedev to explore a new relationship with the West. In 2008, Medvedev proposed a
European security system that would include Russia,
but it was ignored by the West and Putin was not enthusiastic about the proposal, either.
With the onset of the Obama administration, both
sides agreed upon a reset in relations that led to the
New Start Treaty and expansion of the Northern
Distribution Network (NDN). But Putin concluded
that Obama was as reluctant as Bush to provide Russia with a real voice in the proposed East European
anti-missile system, and he persisted in Washington’s campaign to achieve regime change in Russia.
Henceforth Putin embarked upon his anti-NGO drive,
ousted USIA, shut down American radio projects, and
nullified the Nunn-Lugar initiative. He also accelerated his efforts to re-integrate Belarus, Moldova, and
Ukraine into Russia’s orbit, and to convince Georgia
that the price for joining the West would prove more
costly than the benefits involved. He adopted an attitude that the Americans needed him more than he
needed them.
Putin did not lose sleep over the reset’s demise
since he reasoned the United States was in retreat internationally, while its political system was dysfunctional and the economic prospects for Obama’s second
term were problematic. American military might was
second to none, but the Pentagon was discombobulated after a series of setbacks in the Greater Middle
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East. While lecturing Russia on military reform, the
Americans were indifferent to a stunning revelation:
The world’s only superpower could not decisively
defeat opponents only armed with assault rifles and
homemade bombs. In private, even U.S. analysts anticipated the fragmentation of both Iraq and Afghanistan and feared al-Qaeda-like jihadists would exploit
the Syrian civil war to expand their outreach in the
Islamic world.50
Was it any wonder that the American public complained about a huge defense budget? The Pentagon
was now operating in a strange new world where it
had to fight for its budget in earnest. Even Republicans with their eyes on the White House in 2016, like
Kentucky Senator Rand Paul, openly disparaged a
“militaristic” approach to foreign policy. Prominent
defense analysts that had consulted with the Department of Defense (DoD) for decades joined the chorus
of detractors. One wrote:
It is time to abandon the United States’ hegemonic
strategy and replace it with one of restraint. . . . It
would mean removing large numbers of U.S. troops
from forward bases, and creating incentives for allies
to provide for their own security.51

While Putin took comfort in declining American
power, he resented U.S. efforts to foster regime change
in much of the world, including Russia. As a former
American ambassador to Ukraine opined:
. . . his comments suggest he does not see the upheavals that swept countries such as Georgia, Ukraine, Tunisia or Egypt as manifestations of popular discontent
but instead believes they were inspired, funded and
directed by Washington. This may seem like a para-
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noiac view, but Mr. Putin has made so many allusions
to it that it is hard to conclude that he does not believe
it.”52

Today foreign policy experts within the Capital
Beltway are preoccupied with Asia and are divided
over the wisdom of striving for a re-balance in relations with Russia but this is not necessarily the view
of the Obama administration. At the 2013 Munich Security Conference, Vice-President Joseph Biden said
President Obama is convinced that “Europe is the cornerstone of our engagement with the rest of the world”
and “the catalyst for our global cooperation. Europe
is America’s largest economic partner, to the tune of
over $600 billion” and that relationship sustains jobs
on both sides of the Atlantic. Anne-Marie Slaughter, a
former Obama State Department official has observed,
“Together, Europe and the U.S. account for more than
50% of global GDP, have the largest military force in
the world by many multiples, and control a growing
proportion of global energy reserves.”53
Conversely, should the EU fragment, the implications for U.S. security are monumental, and even assuming that does not happen, U.S. planners cannot
ignore the impact that Europe’s protracted economic
difficulties will have upon NATO. Washington is
pressing its European allies to sustain the level of defense spending that they have pledged to uphold, but
few have and most of them will not honor that pledge
until the economic crisis in Europe is over. That may
take years.
Take, for example, the case of France. It has one of
Europe’s most seasoned and capable military establishments—one that had demonstrated in Libya and Mali
that it is prepared to deploy boots on the ground and
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not just “talk the talk.” But hampered by slow growth
and surging unemployment, it broke its pledge to the
EU to hold its budget deficit to 3 percent; by the spring
of 2013, it was about 3.7 percent. France has a military
force of 228,000, but economic constraints will compel
it to cut military personnel by 10,000, to reduce its rapid deployment force by 15,000, and to scrap its plans
to construct a second aircraft carrier, as a consequence
of a declining equipment budget.54 In the meantime,
what does this mean for NATO and for U.S. defense
planning in Europe? Recall that after the Europeans
stumbled in the former Yugoslavia, the United States
was compelled to intervene to end the “Balkan Wars”
that had resulted in 200,000 deaths. Had the United
States been out of the picture in 2008, it is conceivable
that the Russians would have snubbed the Europeans
and marched onto Tbilisi, Georgia, where a puppet
Russian government would have been installed.
Then, too, if the European project is stricken by
serious internal political disputes—in addition to economic stagnation—what would this mean for U.S.Russian relations? There is no easy answer to these
questions, but one thing is clear: One does not have
to be an alarmist to predict that the plight of the EU
project and the Eurozone could culminate in serious
geo-political instability on the continent. Furthermore,
neither the Russian nor the Western side can unilaterally resolve outstanding security problems in Europe;
they must cooperate to stabilize the continent in spite
of their clashing interests and values just as great powers have done over the past several centuries.
Zbigniew Brzezinski believes the Asian Pivot is
justified, but he insists that we must reaffirm our ties
to Europe and that endeavor is senseless without Russia’s participation. As this monograph has demon-
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strated, the greatest challenges to the peace in Europe
are associated with dislocations associated with the
collapse of European communism. As long as Russia remains outside of the major Euro-Atlantic security complex, Europe will be unstable, and that holds
double should the EU and Russia suffer serious deterioration simultaneously. As the United States makes
readjustments in the character and scope of its security community, it must think in terms of partnerships
and joint ventures.55
To find a place in a Western security system, Russia must meet a host of requirements that justify this
daunting undertaking; for example, reforms in the
military that are germane to Russia’s security challenges and consistent with a pluralistic society. In this
connection, consider the following:
•	
A volunteer force must be established that
replaces one served by draftees. There are a
number of arguments against a military that
depends largely upon conscripts. Among other
drawbacks, 1 year is not sufficient time for recruits to acquire the skills required to operate a
hi-tech force.
•	An army that relies heavily upon mass mobilization of reservists and huge general purpose
forces must be scrapped in favor of one with
a smaller, more mobile force that is operable
with air and naval units. As the Five-Day War
indicated, even more important than weapons,
Russia’s military desperately needs to upgrade
its command, control, communications, and information network.
•	
Much of the savings that will occur with a
drawdown to a total of 700,000 soldiers can be
used to attract quality personnel and provide
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a professional force and their families with decent pay and housing so that they can live in
dignity.
•	
With a lighter, more mobile, hi-tech force,
Russia can address its most likely threats. For
example, in “. . . the Caucasus region and the
regions adjacent to the Russian-Kazakh and
Russian-Chinese borders, and also along the
border with North Korea.”56 It can move in this
“revolutionary” direction secure in the knowledge that it retains its ace in the hole—the
world’s second largest nuclear strike force.
•	
A smaller military will provide noncommissioned officers and general officers with access
to educational opportunities that better enable
them to cope with a complicated global environment traumatized by turbulence.
•	
All of this rests upon a democratic political
system whose leaders adhere to a policy of
transparency.
At present, hardliners in the military-industrial
complex oppose most of these items and continue
to favor a military more in keeping with one following the Soviet model. If Russia goes down this road,
vast sums of money will be spent on a force structure
that has been overtaken by global events. More rational members of the defense establishment, however,
may prevail and adopt reforms more in keeping with
the prevailing strategic environment. This outcome
depends upon the Russian people and their leaders,
but in the meantime, there are a host of security issues
that offer U.S.-Russian cooperation and can serve as
confidence-building measures.
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Before discussing them, one final observation
bearing on any Western effort to create a new security
system in the Euro-Atlantic community, with Russian
participation, must be stressed. Any effort must rest
on a set of firm principles. Among others, no member
will claim special spheres of influence; all countries
will be free to choose their security preferences; and
the United States and major West European countries
must reassure former Soviet entities in Central and
Eastern Europe that they will continue to receive protection under Article Five of the Rome Treaty.
The Short Term Prospects For a Re-Balance
in U.S.-Russian Relations.
Officials in both Moscow and Washington have
discarded the word “reset,” and it appears that the
word “re-balance” has taken its place. Presumably
this reformulation entails cautious ad hoc cooperation
and reciprocal concessions. The following represents
an agenda for such cooperation.
Moving Beyond the New Start Treaty.
As President Obama began his second term in office, the world was stunned by news that North Korea
had detonated a nuclear weapon with greater punch
than previous tests suggested. That revelation and
Iran’s bid for a nuclear arsenal underscored why it is
in the national interest of America and Russia to keep
the “nuclear genie in the bottle.”
But there appear to be differences of opinion in
the Kremlin. Specifically, Russian defense analysts
reject Obama’s long-term goal—articulated in 2009
in Prague, Czech Republic—that ultimately nuclear
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weapons must be eliminated. Some argue to the contrary and favor procurement of new advanced nuclear
weapons and more sophisticated ICBMs not only to
checkmate the West, but China as well. It remains to
be seen whether their policies prevail since the costs
involved are significant, and they cannot ignore the
devastating price that the Soviets paid during the
Cold War to keep pace with the United States.
Moving forward with the New Start agreement
is a complicated endeavor, but one thing is clear: To
maintain the U.S. and Russian nuclear forces on a
Cold War footing is both nonsensical and dangerous.
It is irrational, since neither side has any intention of
launching a nuclear strike against the other one, and
perilous because with nuclear weapons on an alert
status in keeping with Cold War tensions, they may be
launched inadvertently as a consequence of a horrible
mistake or technological glitch.
Finding a Solution to the Anti-Missile Defense
Conundrum.
Putin is convinced that the United States is committed to a very dangerous proposition: absolute security. Recall that Soviet strategists feared President
Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative was designed to
nullify a Soviet second strike, and some Russian defense analysts see the U.S. ballistic missile defense activity in this light today. They have focused on “Phase
4 of the missile defense program in Europe, which
envisions the deployment of advanced SM-3 Block IIB
interceptors in Poland by 2022.”57 Moscow scoffs at
the notion that this project is designed for Iranian, not
Russian, ICBMs, nor do Russian analysts take comfort
in claims that the United States is no threat to them.
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In their defense, they can cite a prominent American
student of deterrence who has observed, “In contrast
to the Cold War, it is now hard to make the case that
Russia is more a threat to NATO than the reverse.”58
But demands that Russia be provided with a treaty
and not a political agreement that promises the United
States will not target its nuclear strike force is asking too much of Obama. That is one red line that no
American President can cross at this time. Should an
agreement take place, one wonders whether Russia
will scrap its threat to build up its strategic offensive
capabilities to counter the American missile system. It
may be a bogus threat, but if it is acted upon, it would
create another barrier to cooperation and produce a
disastrous economic outcome for Russia.
High level discussion among U.S. and Russian officials in the spring of 2013 indicated that both sides believed the prospects for an agreement had improved,
and, with two scheduled talks between Obama and
Putin that year, there was hope that at long last a deal
might be in the works. By the summer’s end, most
analysts took a much less optimistic view.59
Working toward a Successful U.S. Exit from Afghanistan.
From the outset of military operations in Afghanistan, Russia provided intelligence, equipment, and air
and land corridors that enabled U.S. forces to project
power in that country. Even more significant, Russia, through its good offices, encouraged the fighters
aligned with the Northern Alliance to provide the
bulk of the boots on the ground in deposing the Taliban and defeating al-Qaeda in the 2003 war.
Russia has played a pivotal role in providing the
U.S. and ISAF units with a supply route—the NDN—
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that has proven to be crucial. At one point, it was the
only land route available when the Pakistanis closed
the Karachi to Afghanistan corridor in protests over
drone strikes and other U.S. operations in their country. The NDN corridor will prove critical once the allied troops exit Afghanistan to comply with the 2014
deadline. They will take 70,000 vehicles and 120,000
shipping containers with them, and it is expected that
a considerable part of this massive shipment will pass
through the NDN. Of course, it is conceivable that the
route through Pakistan will be closed, and all of the
material will have to take the northern route.60
Beyond that date, Russia will play a critical role
when it and other stakeholders—China, India, Iran,
Pakistan, and the United States—provide funding to
pacify and develop a post-American Afghanistan.61
Moscow fears drug dealers, jihadists, and criminal
gangs will use Afghanistan as a pathway into Central
Asia and eventually Russia, so it has incentives that
exceed those in Washington to remain engaged in this
turbulent region. Conversely, this troubled area is far
from the United States and, in reducing its profile in
the Greater Middle East, it is a candidate for exclusion.
Addressing Europe’s Troubled Neighborhood.
Countries once part of the Soviet Union represent
a host of different categories. For the most part, those
in Eastern Europe are success stories. Some, like the
Baltic democracies, are members of the EU or NATO
or both, and they are politically stable and show
considerable economic promise. Others have taken
backward steps, like Hungary, which is displaying
autocratic tendencies, or Bulgaria and Romania that
are experiencing serious economic difficulties. Then
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there are “unaffiliated” countries that are unstable
and potential flashpoints of East-West conflict. Georgia is mentioned in this connection along with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine. In
addition to the friction associated with the Five-Day
War—and failure to resolve it and the fate of Abkhazia and South Ossetia—Azerbaijan and Armenia are
on the brink of another war over Nagorno-Karabakh
that could involve Turkey, which supports the former,
and Russia, which supports the latter. At the same
time, Lukashenka’s dictatorship in Belarus is a source
of friction with Lithuania and Poland, while disputes
between ethnic Russians and Ukrainian nationalists represent a division that has potential for serious
turbulence in Ukraine.
To prevent these latent violent conflicts from becoming manifest, Cold War protocols like the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) and Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe Treaty
(OSCE) must be replaced by arms control and crisis
management mechanisms that reflect the current
strategic environment.
Syria and Iran.
The outcome of the Syrian Civil War will profoundly shape U.S.-Russian relations; as of 2013 and
against the backdrop of chemical weapons use, the
picture looked grim. Kremlin officials cited it as the
latest example of Washington’s obsession with regime
change and evidence that the Obama administration
had ignored lessons from Iraq. According to Sergei
Karaganov, a leading foreign policy expert close to the
Kremlin, “The invasion of Iraq was doomed from the
outset. . . .” Moreover:
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Intervention in a pre-feudal society under the banner
of spreading democracy was an idea so insane that
conspiracy theorists were not alone in attempting to
find some covert intentions behind it.62

More recently, things went from bad to worse
when the “West up-ended dictatorships in Tunisia,
Libya and Egypt.”63
For Putin, Assad is a loyal ally, a good customer
for Russia’s military hardware, and at Tartus, Syria
has provided the Russian Navy with its only Mediterranean base. Diplomacy, not war, is the only solution
to the conflict, but Washington has chosen the latter
option. It will end badly for all concerned. Consider
Obama’s reluctance to intervene militarily—he fears
jihadists close to al-Qaeda will be the beneficiaries,
and officials in the Kremlin are of the same opinion.
In turn, American commentators have portrayed
Putin’s unstinting support for the Syrian dictator as irrational since Assad’s “days are numbered.” Putin has
been impervious to the warning that his propping up
of Assad has alienated Sunnis who represent about 85
percent of the world’s Muslims. Looking at Syria from
the perspective of Russia’s long-term interest, Putin
has adopted a posture that he will someday regret.
The Sunnis will not forget that he not only provided
Assad with weapons and diplomatic cover, he also
worked with the Shiite Mullahs in Tehran to help an
evil dictator wage a war against his own people that
by June of 2013 amounted to 100,000 deaths.
Russian officials retort that those urging U.S. military intervention are the irrational ones and clearly
victims of the American disease: “hubris.” As the
2-year war has demonstrated, the jihadists may be the
most likely winners, not Assad’s moderate opponents.
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With his downfall, al-Qaeda will secure another base
to conduct its evil business in a region both strategically important to Russia and America. Furthermore,
fanatical jihadists are certain to look beyond Syria as
such and hope to precipitate a sectarian war throughout the region. For its part, Moscow can expect some
of the Chechens, Ingush, Dagestanis, and Ossetians
fighting Assad’s force in Syria to join their counterparts in the North Caucasus and to carry jihad into
Russia proper.64
It is imperative that the United States, Russia, the
Arab League, the EU, and the UN prepare for the final
act in the Syrian crisis before, and not after, it occurs.
All have a vested interest in planning for a post-Assad
government that includes a broad cross section of
Syrian society, including some members of the military and government—with whom Moscow enjoys a
close relationship—and the country’s minorities. To
wait until the fighting stops may be too late, for by
then sectarian hatred will obviate any judicious outcome, and the resulting mayhem is likely to impose
severe strains upon the leadership in Washington
and Moscow.
Like Syria, the outcome of the Iranian crisis can
have profound implications for a re-balance. Its resolution would significantly improve the prospects for
cooperation on a host of other issues. A military confrontation can be avoided if Tehran shutters the Fordo
enrichment plant and pledges not to enrich its uranium stockpile beyond 20 percent, excepting for a small
amount to be devoted to medical purposes. In turn,
sanctions that Iran is enduring would end.
Today, evidence of discord within Iranian ruling
circles revolve around whether or not to strike a deal
with the international community. The bite of sanc-
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tions is a major incentive and so is the prospect of a
war. Then, too, should Assad be ousted from power,
one of Iran’s major allies would vanish and provide
further support for the pragmatists who argue that
international trends are not favorable to Iran and
the Mullahs must make a deal with the international
community.
With the election of Hassan Rouhani as president
in the summer of 2013, some observers in Iran and the
West believed him when he said that he was prepared
to negotiate a settlement to the “nuclear crisis” with
the international community. Others remained doubtful that he could do so, given the capacity of the hardliners in Tehran to subvert him.
U.S.-Russian cooperation in resolving the Iranian
crisis would help stabilize the Arab-Iranian Middle
East and do the same thing for a post-U.S. Afghanistan. Of greatest significance, it would avoid a war
that, whatever the outcome, will not serve U.S. national security interests. Also, Iran along with Russia,
China, India, and Pakistan are all stakeholders whose
cooperation is essential if Afghanistan is to escape a
civil war similar to the one that resulted after the Soviets left the country in the late-1980s. Although the Iranians have supported the Taliban to make mischief for
Washington, they have no love for Sunni jihadists that
are tormenting their Hazara-Shiite brothers in that
country. Furthermore, a Taliban victory would guarantee a hostile Afghanistan on their eastern border.
To take this train of events even further, resolution of
the Iranian crisis would ameliorate Iranian-Saudi enmity and reduce fears of the “Iranian revolution” in
other Sunni countries. It might also promote a peaceful outcome to the Israeli-Palestinian crisis and help
stabilize Lebanon.
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There are many analysts who reject any effort to
acknowledge Iran as a major player, given the Mullahs’ horrible human rights record and Iran’s aggressive behavior in the vital Gulf Region.65 But in
today’s turbulent global environment, no country has
sufficient power to achieve its goals unilaterally and
that necessitates partnerships with other countries,
including those with different value systems. Curiously, the same observers that deem it realistic to engage China somehow draw a line when it comes to
Tehran. Strict adherence to this double standard does
not serve the vital interests of the United States. That
said, the hardliners in Iran may prevail, and their success does not bode well for cooperation with them on
security matters.
Cooperation in the Arctic and Northeast Asia.
Even under strained relations, the United States
and allies with Arctic territory should cooperate with
Russia in exploiting the vast resources that exist there
and in Northeast Asia. It is imperative that they develop ground rules for development and settle points
of friction before major campaigns are conducted by
the member countries to exploit the untapped wealth
that exists in this area of the world.
Don’t Forget Russia Is an Asian Power.
Russia’s Far East holds a vast storehouse of gas, oil,
timber, minerals, water, and expanding trade routes.
But it is thinly populated, so it needs outside help to
develop resource-rich Siberia. This means close cooperation with China, Japan, and South Korea since
they are major players in Northeast Asia and repre-
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sent over 20 percent of global GDP. Here, then, is the
answer to the question that has beguiled Russia’s rulers for centuries: “How to develop its vast area east of
Lake Baykal that only is home for 6 percent of Russia’s
population?”66 Given its proximity, size, economic
heft, and shared communist patrimony, China will
play a special role in this enterprise.
The two giants share a 3,600-kilometers-long border, and trade between them amounted to $83 billion
in 2012; that figure will get larger over time. China relies heavily upon Russia’s hydrocarbon wealth, and
that relationship will continue even as other sources
of gas and oil become available. China possesses the
financial resources to fund a host of investments in
Russia and to capitalize joint ventures critical to both
countries. It has arranged a $30 billon dollar loan for
Rosneft and will be repaid with oil.
“Russia is on a course to send an unprecedented
25 percent of its crude exports to eastern markets by
2015.”67 It will be facilitated by expansion of the East
Siberian-Pacific Ocean pipeline (ESPO). Presently, disputes over prices have obstructed a truly comprehensive strategic energy relationship, but there are signs
that a breakthrough is in the cards.
Like their colleagues in Moscow, the Chinese believe the Americans are bent on regime change in China. PLA commanders see the United States as a threat
and resent Washington’s siding with Beijing’s rivals in
Asia—Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam—
over possessions in the East and South China Sea and
consulting with them on security cooperation. In response, they have subverted U.S. attempts to punish
Syria and Iran through UN resolutions.
China has expressed misgivings about Washington’s plans to upgrade its anti-missile capability in the
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Far East to address the threat from North Korea. Likewise, the PLA leadership is wary of the Americans’
Asian Pivot, for they see it as part of Washington’s
campaign to secure permanent bases in Central Asia
and to feed fears of Chinese hegemony among countries throughout the Far East.68
These factors and a show of autocratic solidarity
may explain why Russia was the first country that Xi
Jinping visited as China’s new president. In a written statement upon arriving in Moscow, Xi indicated
“China will make developing relations with Russia a
priority in its foreign policy orientation.”69
But while Putin talks about strategic cooperation
with China, Russian defense analysts have cause to be
worried. Given China’s economic and demographic
advantages, Russia may have to accept the role of
junior partner in the relationship in spite of its vast
advantage in nuclear weapons. Likewise, it is troubling to the Russian military that, while less than 10
million Russian citizens reside in the country’s empty
Far Eastern provinces, 120 million enterprising Chinese, who are anxious to gain access to Siberia’s vast
wealth, live to the south of them. Moscow has not been
happy about Beijing’s exploiting its economic heft to
elbow aside Russia in the five Central Asian countries
that formerly were Soviet Republics. Simultaneously,
funding for the PLA has been significantly upgraded,
and, while it has conducted maneuvers with Russian
troops, both sides maintain a high state of military
readiness along their common border.
Western defense analysts eagerly share these observations with their Russian counterparts to underscore their claim that Russia has no reason to fear the
United States but ample cause to be nervous about the
awakened giant to its south. Russian officials dismiss
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the warning that they face a yellow invasion. What is
more, the Chinese economic miracle is helping Russia
develop its Far Eastern territories via capital, trade,
and parallel infrastructure programs—namely highways, rail lines, and power grids in less developed
parts of Northeast Asia. In the meantime, China and
Russia hope to nullify America’s global influence by
working with the BRIC countries, although the Brazilians and the Indians may not cooperate—this is especially true of New Delhi since it still sees China as its
most serious competitor for influence in East Asia.
Also, there is a serious barrier to Sino-Russo cooperation in the foreign policy realm: China deems a
stable relationship with the United States as its principle foreign policy objective. That conviction provides
a window of opportunity for Washington to improve
relations with Beijing and to provide a pathway for a
triangular partnership between America, China, and
Russia. But there is a major roadblock to this initiative:
The Mandarins in Beijing are convinced that, the U.S.
hegemon aside, China’s major security problem is internal, not external. Managing world affairs is not one
of China’s priorities, and this explains why it often
abstains in the Security Council rather than vote for
or against a measure that excites other members of the
Council. It also explains why gaining access to foreign
markets is a priority. Economic, and not geo-political
factors then, are conceivably the basis for China’s new
assertive territorial claims in the South China Sea.
No matter what the motive, Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines are now responding with
hostility to China’s aggressive foreign policy initiatives and threats. Its highly publicized cyber attacks
upon U.S. interests certainly have damaged its reputation among the American public.
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Still, China has joined the United States and Russia in the most sweeping attempt to sanction Pyongyang for its recent nuclear weapons test and for selling
nuclear weapons grade material to third parties. The
leadership in Beijing displayed anger when their Korean cousins nullified the 60-year-old peace treaty that
ended the Korean conflict. The Western media also
highlighted the comments of Deng Yuwen, a deputy
editor of the Communist Party publication, when he
wrote in the Financial Times, “Beijing should give up
on Pyongyang and press for the reunification of the
Korean Peninsula.”70
The sanctions upon Kim Jung-Un’s government
will have an economic and diplomatic impact if they
are fully implemented by China. That caveat is noteworthy since China watchers observe that the Chinese
leadership has not been twisting the young dictator’s
arms lest they produce their worst fear: the collapse
of the communist regime in Pyongyang. In addition
to the flight of millions of North Korean immigrants
into China, it would have to live with a unified Korea
allied with the United States. For PLA commanders,
reunification is unthinkable, and the same holds true
for their civilian masters since soon after Yuwen’s oped was published, he was fired.
Nonetheless, should Un remain in power, the Chinese leaders must fear his reckless behavior will provoke two disturbing outcomes: First, since the February 12, 2013, detonation of an upgraded North Korean
nuclear weapon, there has been a dramatic spike in
the number of South Koreans, about 65 percent, who
believe the time has come for them to develop their
own nuclear strike force. In addition to the threat
from the North, many Korean commentators believe
that the U.S. pledge to provide their country with a
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nuclear umbrella is no longer credible, so they must
build their own nuclear deterrent, or, at the very least,
the Americans must return the nuclear weapons that
they withdrew from South Korea in 1991.
Second, those in Tokyo who have been lobbying
for a constitutional revision that would allow Japan
to secure its own nuclear arsenal are now receiving
a more congenial reception. Chinese strategists must
conclude therefore that, if Washington dissuades
Japan from taking this provocative action, in compensation the United States will have to upgrade its military presence dramatically in and around the Korean
Peninsula.
In response to mounting concern about North Korea, high level American and Chinese officials have
been conducting talks—including communications
between both presidents—to reduce both provocative words and actions on the part of the United States
and North Korea. In June 2013, President Obama and
President Xi Jinping met in the Californian desert to
discuss the future of U.S.-China relations. No concrete
agreements were reached, but both presidents clearly
indicated that, in spite of outstanding areas of dispute,
they agreed it was in the vital interest of both countries to stop the slide in relations. That said, neither
man seemed to have any idea about how that goal
could be achieved, given Beijing’s concern about the
Asian pivot and Washington’s concern about China’s
aggressive posture toward its neighbors—some of
whom are U.S. allies.71
The prospects for more harmonious relations between China and the United States received a body
blow several weeks later when it was revealed by
an American contractor working for the intelligence
community that Washington had monitored com-
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munications from China with special intent. To make
matters worse, the young man in question, Edward
Snowden, originally sought refuge in Hong Kong,
which he threatened to use as a base to disseminate
top secret material collected by the National Security
Agency. He then fled to Moscow in transit to a safe
harbor somewhere in the world, and that incident
provided a further chill to American-Russian relations. At the same time, many foreign policy analysts
predicted that this affair would bring both Russia and
China closer together in the face of the “American”
threat to their security.
In assessing the relationship between China, Russia, and the United States, the following questions
are pertinent: What are the prospects for a close SinoRussian security condominium? Is a U.S.-Russian security relationship possible? What are the chances for
a triangular relationship that promotes the security
interests of all three parties? One thing is clear on all
of these matters: the nature of American-Russian relations could have an impact upon the future of Washington’s Asian pivot. In considering the pivot, then,
the U.S. defense community must include Russia in
their assessments of the security environment in Asia.
Now Is Not the Time for a Pause.
The Syrian crisis provides overwhelming evidence
that there is no justification for a pause in attempts
to sustain U.S.-Russian security cooperation. Even if
efforts to negotiate a settlement to the crisis fail and
prospects for cooperation take a nosedive in the short
run, in the long run, both Obama and Putin recognize
that they must remain engaged.
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Of course, the road ahead will be difficult. Ever
since Putin’s crackdown and the Magnitsky-Litvinov
imbroglio—the U.S. law that punishes Russian human
rights violators in the first case and the Russian law
in response that denies Americans the right to adopt
Russian orphans in the second one—some in Washington have recommended a pause in U.S.-Russian
relations. They claim that in this frigid environment,
fruitful cooperation is a nonstarter, but they should
recall that the golden era of arms control occurred in
the midst of the Cold War and at a time when the Soviet Union was called “the evil empire.” In 1987, the
author of these words, Ronald Reagan, negotiated the
elimination of an entire category of rockets through
the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
with Mikhail Gorbachev. It was facilitated over a period of years by the interaction of mid-level diplomats
and the cooperation of military representatives on
both sides. This interaction promoted confidence and
trust and resulted in a number of arms control agreements that served U.S. security.
Convinced that Russia has no choice but to engage
the West, Putin appears ready to reaffirm cooperation with Obama on an ad hoc basis, although he will
prove to be a difficult partner since he is preoccupied
with consolidating his power at home and sees value
in taking a hard line with Washington in that enterprise. At the same time, Putin understands that it is
neither in his interest nor that of Russia to turn his
back on the world’s only superpower. He also knows
that many of those in the United States that are bitter
political opponents of Obama favor confrontational
relations with Moscow. In sum, he has 3 years to reach
an accommodation with the United States.
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From the American perspective, cooperating with
Russia on security matters is one step in many that
some U.S. statesmen hope will secure Russia’s cooperation in addressing common security problems—
the proliferation of WMD, the radical jihadist threat,
and many other issues. Also, U.S. proponents of the
reset—or whatever is the current terminology—hope
that ultimately it will lead to a security partnership
between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community. Of
course, it will be a long-term effort, and it will take
patience to accomplish. It certainly will be sidetracked
by intervening events but, if fruitful, it will enhance
U.S. security by establishing a more stable foothold in
Europe and provide a foundation upon which Washington’s Asian pivot will rest.
The Boston Marathon bombings have given a
positive boast to the prospects for more extensive
American-Russian cooperation in joint anti-terrorist
operations. In the immediate aftermath of that tragedy, many Russian officials welcomed comments from
American analysts and diplomats regarding insurgencies in the North Caucasus. Perhaps even more significant, many ordinary Americans for the first time were
informed that the Russians were helping the United
States in the fight against Islamic jihadists—the very
same people responsible for 9/11. In sum, there is a
basis for the claim that U.S.-Russian cooperation in
fighting terrorism is plausible.
This does not mean ignoring human rights violations in Russia, but it means treating the regime there
the same way Washington treats the Chinese ruling
elite. U.S. and Russian leaders must not waste time
but work toward a peaceful resolution of the crises in
Syria, Iran, and North Korea. Not to do so is to run
the risk of watching latent disasters become manifest
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calamities that will do grave harm to the security of
their respective countries.
The uncertain outcome of the Syrian civil war has
the potential to sabotage even a limited security relationship, but proponents of this initiative cite a meeting of the minds on an important matter: preventing
the Syrian crisis from morphing into a horrendous regional disaster. Russian commentators, for example,
have taken comfort in the belief that Putin’s arguments are having some impact upon Western analysts
and statesmen.
As Pavel Baev states:
What adds credibility to the Russian leadership’s case,
at least in their own eyes, is the supposition that only
violent chaos and state failure can follow the collapse
of the al-Assad regime. Every month of the civil war
makes this more plausible. As the internecine fighting escalates, the rebel groups and factions inevitably
grow more radicalized. . .,72

and this development has caused expressions of concern in Israel since it “must take into account the prospect of an Islamic state emerging in Syria.”73 In sum,
Putin clearly relishes the notion that the Americans
have had to concede that his claim that the international campaign to dump Assad may produce a worse
outcome than Assad’s ouster is designed to prevent.
At the same time, Russian analysts believes that the
Americans simply do not understand the complexities
of conflicting forces that prevail in the Greater Middle
East. In short, they are victims of a major intellectual
error. Putin may be kidding himself when he brushes
aside the claim that his support for the Syrian dictator
will cause him problems among the largely Sunni Islamic community. The same may be said for his disre95

garding the fact that a disaster in Syria will potentially
do far greater harm to Russia’s security than it will do
to the United States.
Preparing for the Unexpected.
As American and Russian leaders struggle to find
avenues of cooperation, history instructs them to “expect the unexpected.” The Strategic Arms Limitations
Treaty (SALT) II was aborted by President Carter in
1980 as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Some observers have mentioned this incident in pondering what role the Winter Olympics might play
in U.S.-Russian relations. They will be conducted in
the Russian Black Sea city of Sochi in February 2014.
Open discussion of this matter surfaced when the fate
of Snowden was being considered. The United States
demanded that he be returned from the Russian airport where he was seeking temporary asylum to face
charges that he leaked classified National Security
Council (NSC) documents. Russia’s refusal to comply prompted expressions of outrage at both ends of
Pennsylvania Avenue. Although a lonely voice, Senator Lindsey Graham, the Republican from South Carolina, demanded the United States boycott the games in
retaliation.
However, Graham identified something that Putin
highly values. The Kremlin has invested $51 billion to
construct a massive Winter Olympic Games complex
in Sochi. Project costs may far exceed that amount since
criminal gangs and corrupt officials are having a royal
feast filching funds from the enterprise. Entire neighborhoods are being bulldozed while their residents
are desperately searching for new shelter and a large
number of workers from the impoverished Central
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Asian Republics are being paid abysmally low wages
to fill construction jobs. Putin has embarked upon this
expensive project with one major goal in mind: to improve Russia’s international image and to proclaim
that it will no longer take a back seat to anyone.
His crusade, however, is not trouble-free. Sochi
sits in the midst of the turbulent Caucasus, home for
many disgruntled minorities. Circassian nationalists
claim Sochi as part of their ancient homeland—a territory that their ancestors occupied until the early-19th
century when they were expelled by Russian invaders.
Like other nations in the North Caucasus seeking independence from Moscow, they may exploit the publicity surrounding Sochi to publicize their demands
globally. Some of them, like Russia’s most wanted
terrorist—Doku Umarov—have already threatened
violence to publicize their jihadist war with Russia.
Presumably, this would include suicide bombings and
attacks on public officials and security units, and even
the athletes may become targets. Kremlin officials believe they have things under control, but they may be
badly mistaken. Whatever the challenges facing them,
how could the insurgents forgo a once-in-a-lifetime
opportunity to make their plight known to the world
in a bold terrorist strike? Of course, the global publicity spawned by the awful bombings in Boston is likely
to encourage copycats to produce similar mayhem at
the Sochi Olympics.
Putin’s repressive crackdown may encourage liberal Russians out of desperation to seek new ways
to respond to his wholesale attack upon their human
rights. Some gay rights activists, for example, may
endorse a campaign to boycott the Olympics. It is unlikely that athletic organizations from the participating countries, their governments, and their financial
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sponsors will condone a boycott and withdraw as
many did during the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow.
President Obama has indicated that, while he finds
the anti-gay campaign in Russia repugnant, he does
not favor a boycott. But under existing circumstances,
the threat resonates, given the dramatic technological
changes that have occurred since 1980 in the information arena. In this instance, the Internet and social
media make an unprecedented international political
protest possible. There are thousands of people within
Russia, and Russians in the diaspora, along with human rights activists in the West, who have the capacity to undertake a campaign of this nature. Also, unlike
the North Caucasus insurgents, the Russian dissidents
are not vulnerable to the charge that “they are nothing
more than terrorists.”
Even if the campaign fails to sabotage the games, it
offers dissidents an international event around which
they can publicize the plight of Russian democrats
and do grave damage to Putin’s quest to improve
Russia’s image globally. Likewise, Putin’s crackdown
could become a problem for Washington, as it has the
capacity to facilitate an anti-Kremlin backlash that
could make cooperation with the Russian government
a truly costly political enterprise for the American
government.
EPILOGUE
The Navalny Question.
By the fall of 2013, Putin-watchers concluded that
Russia was already on the road to Stalin Lite. Many
also believed that one could gain a glimpse of Russia’s future by assessing the fate of Navalny. About a
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week after the Boston massacre, Navalny was tried for
embezzling $500,000 from a timber company in Kirov.
The charge was fabricated and driven by political considerations that emanated from Moscow since local
authorities found no basis for it. By this time, the tall,
blond, 37-year-old blogger was no longer a mystery
man, since publicity surrounding his brave confrontation with the Kremlin had earned him the respect of a
growing number of Russians. They admired his courage, shared his anger about corruption, and enjoyed
his tart humor directed at the Kremlin. His nationalistic proclivities and common touch had the potential
of attracting provincials to him. Two years previously,
he had a name recognition of 6 percent, but by the
spring of 2013, it had escalated to 47 percent.74
In a short period of time, he had emerged as a
political opponent of consequence, and his political
ambitions earned him the respect and enmity of the
Kremlin overlords. As a result, he anticipated that he
would be charged with a crime, found guilty, and,
even if he escaped a prison sentence, his being a felon
would deny him the opportunity to run for public office. On July 18, he was found guilty and received a
5-year prison sentence along with a large fine. But the
very next day, he was released and was free until his
appeal was considered. Some Russian watchers assumed that the Kremlin leadership was behind this
move out of anticipation of a planned street protest
to be conducted the following weekend. Others indicated that his release was further proof that the Putin
team had been divided over how best to address the
Navalny question. Some feared that if he was harshly
treated, he would become a martyr. Others wanted to
crush him since there were doubts about the ability of
associates to continue the fight while he was in prison.
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Among some prominent foreign commentators, the
incident underscored a gathering consensus: Navalny
had become the most effective spokesman for the anti-Putin opposition, and he had the unique personal
qualifications to lead a growing army of disgruntled
Russians in a truly significant political movement.
Unlike many of his cohorts, Navalny did not flee
Russia but remained there prepared to continue his
fight in prison with the help of his comely and articulate wife, Julia. He has stated repeatedly that the power and capacity of the Kremlin overlords had been
grossly exaggerated. “The people who work in business at a high enough level can tell you that there’s no
machine at all.” They may be able to “destroy a single
person,” like Khodorkovsky or himself. But they cannot do so “against a huge number of people, there’s
no machine. It’s a ragtag group of crooks and unified
under the portrait of Putin.”
In a blog the day before he travelled to Kirov to
attend his trial, he wrote: “Enough whining and being scared. It’s time to organize and get to work.”
Then after comments on freedom and human rights
he continued:
All of these years, I’ve been learning alongside of you
how to organize even in conditions of a state propaganda machine, intimidation, and a lack of money. . . .
There is no one but you. There is no one who cares
about what’s going on in the country more than you.
There are no magic volunteers who will show up and
do the work for you. . . .”75

An intense crowd of supporters greeted him at the
Moscow train station the day after he was found guilty.
His return was covered via the Internet, including visual segments; even the Kremlin-dominated TV gave
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him coverage. Since then, Russian-watchers have concluded that he is the real deal, a man capable of leading a popular anti-Kremlin movement, even though
he is someone who faces a jail sentence. He told the
gathering that, in effect, they had demonstrated that
there was no reason to fear the Kremlin’s wrath, and
they were responsible for his release.
Some pundits had a different perspective, claiming
that Navalny’s help was required to give legitimacy
to the anticipated re-election of the acting Mayor of
Moscow, Sergei Sobyanin. It was assumed that Navalny would run for that office and lose the race but
in the process demonstrate that, even in a fair fight,
the Kremlin-backed candidate would win. The young
blogger pledged to achieve a victory for the people—
his election—but the odds makers deemed that a remote prospect.
On September 9, the Kremlin was shocked by the
election results: Sobyanin allegedly received 51 percent of the vote so he was re-elected without a run-off.
But official results indicated that Navalny got almost
one-third of the votes cast even though he did not have
access to TV and was denied other assets to which the
Mayor was privy. What is more, Navalny claimed that
the election was fabricated, and Sobyanin did not obtain the votes required to claim a first round victory.
The blogger attracted an army of young people—
“Generation Navalny”—to his campaign, “. . . the
thousands of young people who came of age after the
Soviet collapse and who yearn for a more inclusive
politics.” They conducted a ground campaign that
Russians had never witnessed in their history. They
“pounded the pavement, knocked on doors, passed
out leaflets, manned phone lines, and organized online for the charismatic opposition leader.”76
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Navalny threatened to organize his followers in
street protests, but whatever does take place, analysts
have spent considerable time pondering the future of
his movement. Did his followers have the resolve and
political acumen to fill his shoes if he went to prison?
Could they expand their power base? Could Navalny
continue the fight from prison? Has his success inspired members of the establishment to consider an
alliance with him? There are rumors that he has secret
talks with some pragmatic Kremlin insiders; are they
true, and, if so, what do they mean?
Although uncertain of the answers, a growing
number of analysts both within and outside of Russia are convinced that Navalny’s challenge is further
evidence that Putin’s future is in grave doubt. Indeed,
some have concluded that even some of his closest associates now have reservations about his capacity to
cope with his political opponents.
Whatever Navalvy’s fate, as indicated earlier, the
turbulence associated with the Power Vertical could
conceivably produce two compelling outcomes. First,
Putin’s repressive measures justify the claim that he
is creating a police state where the authorities intrude
upon both the private and public space of the Russian
people. Or second, pragmatists in the Kremlin like
Sobyanin and Shoigu join forces with the new politicians as exemplified by Navalny, and together they
take the measures necessary to set Russia on a slow
road to pluralism.
Or perhaps there is a third outcome; Putin’s worse
fears are realized as Russia disintegrates after it
proves incapable of addressing its cascading cultural,
economic, and political problems. U.S. planners must
pay serious attention to all of these questions, given
Russia’s large imprint on the international stage.
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Syria and U.S.-Russian Relations.
On September 10, President Obama delivered a
much anticipated speech on why he was prepared to
punish the Syrian regime for using poison gas against
its own people. But he stunned the nation when he
said that he would delay taking military action. As a
consequence of back-channel deliberations, a peaceful
resolution of the crisis was at hand. It was called the
“Russian Plan” and proposed that Syria surrender its
poison gas to UN weapons inspectors for their ultimate destruction. Within a week, a number of equally
unexpected developments occurred in rapid order:
•	Putin scolded Obama in a New York Times opinion editorial for celebrating American exceptionalism. But in other remarks, Putin indicated that he trusted Obama to honor any peace
initiative.
•	John Kerry and Lavrov met in Geneva to begin
talks about how to destroy Syria’s gas arsenal.
•	Assad gave impetus to their “framework agreement” by sending a letter to the UN asserting
that Syria would sign the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
•	American and Russian diplomats established
the basis for a diplomatic solution to the Syrian Civil War through the Geneva-2 peace
initiative.
Critics who scoffed at the Russian Plan were
shocked by these revelations and even more so when
the United States accepted Moscow’s demands that
Washington not insert language in the UN resolution
that condoned the use of force if Syria violated the
agreement. Some pundits suggested that Putin had
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outmaneuvered Obama since the Russian Plan was a
rouse designed to buy time for Assad.
Seasoned foreign policy analysts, however, indicated that Putin was genuinely concerned about
Syria’s toxic weapons because he feared they might
be secured by jihadists who would use them in the
North Caucasus. They also found reason to acknowledge that the Kremlin was justified in pressing the
Americans on the legitimate question: “What would
happen after Assad was removed from power?” Moscow feared Syria would collapse much like Qaddafi’s
Libya had but with even far worse consequences for
the region.
Western leaders rightfully scolded Putin and Lavrov for suggesting that the rebels in Syria, and not
Assad’s forces, were responsible for the gas attacks
that the weapons inspectors confirmed. Such claims
in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary
were absurd, and they diminished Putin’s campaign
to burnish his image as an international leader of
consequence. At the same time, the international
community applauded his diplomatic efforts and, in
turn, enhanced his image at home. Indeed, the role he
played in finding a nonviolent resolution of the Syrian
crisis indicated that Russia was once again an international actor that could no longer be ignored. Russia
was back! Just what that would mean for Putin over
the long term, however, remained unclear. After all,
Russia’s most serious security problems were internal,
not external.
Finally, what did this week of tumultuous events
mean for a) U.S.-Russia relations and b) the U.S. national security community? In the first instance, recall
that after the June G-8 Summit in Ireland, pundits in
Washington claimed U.S.-Russian relations had hit an
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insurmountable firewall. The time had come to bury
the “reset corpse,” and any effort to revive it was
foolhardy. But one can make the contrary case; joint
efforts to resolve the Syrian Civil War suggested a
dramatic new chapter in the reset was about to begin.
The steps already undertaken obligated both sides to
continue their collaboration. That said, the road ahead
was rocky and uncertain. For example, what was to be
done about the al-Qaeda fighters in Syria?
For its part, the U.S. national security community
must consider a number of outcomes: a Syria without
Assad but under the control of a broad but weak coalition of leaders; a country fragmented into several
parts; and a Syria where jihadists are the most dominant military force. In response to these outcomes,
U.S. defense analysts must assess what role American
forces would play in a multilateral campaign to eliminate them and to stabilize Syria. Direct U.S. military
involvement might be a bridge too far, but clearly
American military assets would be required to achieve
a successful international campaign.
It is premature to make any firm predictions about
the fate of Geneva-2, U.S.-Russian efforts to crush the
al-Qaeda groups in Syria, and the broader issue of security cooperation on their part. It is evident, however,
that in spite of the many obstacles to cooperation, it is
in the U.S. national interest to work with Russia where
possible and address shared security concerns.
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